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ABSTRACT 
Using a cross-sectional regression model, we answer two questions related to the determinants of highly active 
antiretroviral treatment (HAART) coverage across 108 countries using 2006 and 2009 HAART data. The first asks 
how political institutions function to enable better HAART coverage outcomes; and the second asks whether 
countries with higher levels of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage. We find weak 
statistical evidence that both democracies and authoritarian countries can achieve high levels of HAART coverage; 
cultural fractionalization has less of an effect on coverage than we expected; and centralized governments achieve 
higher treatment coverage outcomes. The effect of political institutions is muted when we control for state 
capacity and funding. We apply two broad measures of state capacity, namely tax revenue as a share of GDP and 
our own state capacity index developed using Principal Component Factor Analysis. We find evidence that high 
levels of state capacity are positively related to HAART coverage outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the challenge for HIV/AIDS policy-makers, practitioners and international 
organisations has been to find ways to make the universal provision of Highly Active Antiretroviral 
Treatment (HAART) a financially feasible component of the strategy for combating the epidemic. Indeed, 
we have seen a significant increase in the funding made available for HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment, and a large proportion of this funding has been channeled towards increased treatment 
provision. In combination with the increased pool of resources, we have seen a decline in the cost of 
brand-name ARV drugs and an upsurge in the availability of cheaper generic drug regimens particularly 
in low-resource countries. These crucial developments resulted in a dramatic acceleration in HAART 
coverage across countries. In low- and middle-income countries alone there was a 10-fold increase in 
access to treatment between 2003 and 2008 according to the UNAIDS and WHO 2009 AIDS Epidemic 
Update (UNAIDS, 2009:16). As of December 2009, the estimated number of people receiving HAART in 
these low and middle-income countries was 5.2 million, from below 400 000 in 2002 (UNAIDS, 2010:7).   
 
It is commonly accepted that funding and assistance from international donors has played a pivotal role 
in the achievements of the last decade along with the funding commitments of domestic governments. 
Figure 1.1 below reflects the sharp rise in the total annual resources available for HIV/AIDS over the 
period from the signing of the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS in 2001, to 2007. The 
timeline also reflects the introduction of landmark international donor assistance projects over the 
period 1986-2007.  
 
Figure 1.1. Total Annual Resources Available for AIDS, 1986-2007 
 
Source: UNAIDS (2008:188) 
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To date, resources have been contributed through a combination of sources including domestic public 
expenditure, international bilateral agreements, multilateral organisations, and other international 
sources such as private donors (e.g. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation). 
This effort has been aided by the creation of global treatment coverage targets such as the WHO and 
UNAIDS ‘3-by-5’ initiative and the introduction of programmes such as the US President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003.1The WHO and UNAIDS ‘3-by-5’ initiative launched in 2003 sought 
to provide HAART to 3 million people by the year 2005 as part of the broader goal of ensuring universal 
access to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS. The strategy entailed partnering with national 
governments in AIDS-affected countries to ensure a reliable supply of medicines, create standardized 
drug delivery tools, and to share knowledge on successful drug provision practice. At the same time, 
bilateral aid to HIV/AIDS control and contributions to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria from 
the OECD and high-income countries has risen considerably. UNAIDS and WHO have most recently 
introduced Treatment 2.0 which is a global programme designed to simplify the way HIV treatment is 
currently provided and to scale up access by reducing treatment costs, making treatment regimens 
simpler, reducing the burden on health systems, and improving the quality of life of people living with 
HIV (UNAIDS, 2010:106). 
 
However, in May 2010 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) published that they had increasing concerns 
about backtracking in donor commitment towards HIV/AIDS intervention programmes. They argue that 
international donors have diluted their initial ‘emergency’ commitment and shifted funding toward a 
wider range of health issues despite the proven bene its of HIV/AIDS intervention on healthcare systems 
overall (MSF, 2010). Nattrass and Gonsalves (2009) wrote extensively on this phenomenon in which 
proponents of this redirection of funds argue that the ‘AIDS lobby’ has garnered an unfair amount of 
resources to the extent that overall health systems have been undermined and funds had consequently 
been wasted and misdirected. The authors add that the funding backlash has been exacerbated by the 
recent global economic crisis which has reduced the resources available for foreign aid. Without 
debating the veracity of the arguments put forward by proponents of the funding backlash, it is simply 
worth noting that the current climate demands that domestic governments in low and middle-income 
countries, which have to this point relied heavily on donor funding, play an increased role in ensuring 
that HIV/AIDS intervention programmes are sustained. Importantly, ensuring that the increasing trend in 
the provision of HAART is sustained will rely on the ability of domestic governments to increase public 
funding towards treatment and continue investments in the healthcare systems, infrastructure, and 
institutions to deliver treatment and care.   
 
1.1. Research questions and hypotheses 
This paper presents an analysis of the determinants of HAART coverage across countries. HAART 
coverage refers to the number of people estimated to be receiving antiretroviral treatment as a share of 
                                                          
1
 Details of the ‘3-by-5’ initiative are available online at: http://www.who.int/3by5/en/   
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the projected number of people who need treatment. We categorize these determinants along two 
main dimensions, namely: a domestic political institution dimension; and a state capacity dimension. We 
review previous approaches used to account for the role of domestic political factors in explaining the 
levels of HAART coverage in a country. Much of this literature has focused on the type of political regime 
that prevails in a country and we find that democratic systems are typically presented as the most likely 
to result in higher HAART coverage. However, there is less of a focus on the potential shortfalls of 
democratic AIDS governance and why a country like South Africa which is a democracy, has until 
recently performed so poorly in terms of instituting countermeasures to reverse the spread of the 
epidemic. Different ‘political’ variables used in this literature such as electoral accountability, press 
freedoms, and state legitimacy tell us precious little about how a democratic political system actually 
translates into higher HAART coverage outcomes and tend to read more like a set of principles or values 
that typify a democracy. We do not look at these variables. If we are to accept that democratic systems 
are more likely to result in higher HAART outcomes, we need to understand how this takes place and 
why authoritarian political systems would not achieve the same outcomes?  
 
Our focus in this paper will be on more pragmatic aspects of governance: decision-making and 
implementation. We argue that providing treatment from a governance perspective relies on domestic 
governments making critical decisions on issues such as whether to rollout treatment, what are the 
realistic targets for the short- to long-term, what is the appropriate strategy to achieve our goals, what 
financial, human and infrastructural resources are available to us, and what is the best programme of 
action for implementation? We believe that in recent years as HAART has become a more feasible and 
critical part of global intervention strategies, studies of treatment coverage can shift away from trying to 
find abstract measures of ‘political will and commitment’, and move towards pragmatic analyses of the 
factors that impact directly on the decisions that governments make about expanding treatment access, 
and the factors that impact directly on how those decisions can be implemented? In our view, 
governments can really show their commitment by making progressive political decisions to increase 
treatment coverage over time (based on feasible targets) and allocating sufficient resources to meeting 
those targets. This will be the focus of our research questions and subsequent analysis.    
 
We present the following set of (political) institutional variables: political regime, cultural 
fractionalization, and government centralization. We argue later that these variables impact directly on 
government decision-making processes. The first research question we seek to answer is:  
 
Q.1. How do political institutions work to enable better HAART coverage outcomes? 
An important corollary to this question is whether there is any evidence showing that highly 
authoritarian systems can also enable higher HAART coverage outcomes? 
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On this first question we expect to find that while there are examples of non-democratic countries that 
have achieved high HAART coverage, it is generally more likely that higher levels of HAART coverage will 
be achieved in democracies; high levels of politically salient or institutionalized cultural fractionalization 
are likely to result in lower levels of HAART coverage; centralized governance institutions are most likely 
to result in higher levels of HAART coverage in resource-constrained countries.   
 
We then define state capacity broadly as the ability of government to implement policy. Previous 
studies of the determinants of HAART coverage have sought to account for specific aspects of 
healthcare sector capacity that influence the level of HAART coverage in a country. As we will describe in 
the literature section, these often include standard measures of human resource capacity in the health 
sector, as well as perceptions of government effectiveness. In this paper, we will broaden the existing 
understanding of state capacity and measures thereof. We take the view that providing HAART is a 
highly resource-intensive process that encompasses not only funding, but the infrastructural, 
institutional, and human resource capacity to ensure effectiveness as well. We draw from state capacity 
literature and introduce two broader measures of state capacity as possible determinants of HAART 
coverage, namely: tax revenue as a share of GDP, and our own State Capacity Index (SCI). This 
exploratory analysis seeks to answer the second research question of this paper: 
 
Q.2. Do countries with higher levels of state capacity as measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP or 
an index of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage? 
 
On this second question we exp ct to find that countries with higher levels of state capacity, as 
measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP and an index of state capacity, generally achieve higher 
levels of HAART coverage. 
 
To answer these questions, we analyze HAART coverage data from UNAIDS for 108 countries with HIV 
prevalence greater than 0.1% for 2006, and the most recently released data for 2009 using Ordinary 
Least Squares regression method. Although most of our analysis will concern the recent 2009 data, we 
compare these results with 2006 (cross-sectional) data as a way to compare (static comparison) how the 
determinants of HAART coverage might have changed since 2006, the year just after the UNAIDS and 
WHO ‘3-by-5’ campaign during which there was a significant increase in global funding and thus access 
to treatment. We will focus on our new state capacity index and not the tax revenue variable in our 
cross-sectional analysis of the 2006 and 2009 HAART coverage data. Applying our index in this 
comparison will allow us to assess the importance of endogenous state capacity as a determinant of 
HAART coverage in 2006, a period just after the ‘3-by-5’ initiative lapsed and before the funding 
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backlash; and 2009 which coincides with the donor funding backlash and the global financial crisis. We 
argue that the challenges in this recent period have placed increased focus on domestic governments to 
sustain treatment provision and so domestic capacity to do so is even more critical. We do not use a 
time series analysis because we find insufficient time-variant data up to 2009 for our political institution 
variables to add real value. Specifically, the cultural fractionalization indicator that we use is only 
available as a constant value for each country for the period of our analysis and the government 
centralization variable is only available for 2004 as the most recent year. A cross-sectional approach is 
also consistent with some of the studies reviewed in the literature section.2       
 
1.2. Rationale and purpose of the study 
A number of studies which we will look at in the literature section have focused on the provision of 
treatment to those who need it as a measurable outcome of national response strategies. These studies 
look at HAART coverage as a dependent variable which has the advantage of being an estimable, 
quantitative measure that can be compared across countries. Although not completely accurate, HAART 
coverage estimates look to capture both the public and private provision of essential treatment which 
gives a good indication of how a society as a whole has responded to the epidemic. In the absence of a 
vaccine, HAART offers an effective strategy to policy-makers for managing the disease by prolonging 
lives, improving the quality of life for those people who are already infected, and reducing 
infectiousness. This has the effect of reducing the burden on hospitals for instance, as less people reach 
the stage where their immune systems are fatally weakened by HIV. HAART is different from an HIV 
prevention strategy which focuses on reducing the number of new HIV infections. Table 1.1 below 
summarizes and contrasts the characteristics and priorities relating to prevention and treatment 
strategies according to UNAIDS.   
 
Table 1.1.Characteristics and priorities of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment strategies 
Prevention Strategies
3
 Treatment Strategies
4
 
Change sexual and drug-using behaviour Increasing individual knowledge of HIV status 
Promote correct and consistent use of condoms Reduce stigma among health providers and the public 
Reduce the number of sexual partners Build human capacity to sustain treatment 
Improve the management of STIs Improve supply management to minimize delays 
Broaden access to HIV testing and counseling Integrate HIV care with other health services 
Increase access to drug  users harm-reduction plans  Improve patient monitoring and treatment adherence  
Promote medical male circumcision  Ensuring equity of access to treatment  
Effective infection control in health care settings Using expanded treatment access to bolster prevention 
 
                                                          
2
 Nattrass (2006), Schwardmann (2008), Nattrass (2008a) each apply a cross-sectional analysis 
3
 UNAIDS (2008:97) 
4
 UNAIDS (2006:13) 
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It is clear from the table that prevention strategies are different from treatment interventions in terms 
of their respective priority areas which we draw from various UNAIDS reports. It is thus reasonable to 
expect that prevention strategies would be influenced by a different set of determinants to those for 
HAART. This highlights the potential challenge with analyzing studies of prevention outcomes to 
enhance our understanding of HAART coverage. We need to be cautious in our analysis of studies that 
focus on prevention interventions for the simple reason that a variable that influences a reduction in the 
number of new infections in a country will not necessarily result in higher HAART coverage. However, 
this does not preclude us from assessing studies of prevention interventions to draw insight from the 
empirical and statistical approaches applied that may be relevant to our analysis. A cursory glance at 
Table 1.1 above shows that prevention and treatment strategies are also interlinked – the prevention 
strategies include broadening access to HIV testing and counseling as a priority, whilst the treatment 
strategies include leveraging expanded access to treatment to bolster prevention efforts The interlinked 
nature of some aspects of prevention and treatment strategies means that it may not always be clear 
which strategy resulted in which outcome e.g. HIV incidence (rate of new infections) is in part a function 
of the fact that treatment reduces the viral load and thus the infectiousness of HIV positive individuals; 
while treatment strategies for the long term may become less feasible in a resource-constrained 
environment if prevention strategies do not help to reduce the rate of new infections.  
 
The research questions outlined in this paper build on the premise that providing HAART is thus a crucial 
component of a national intervention strategy. Understanding why countries have performed so 
differently in terms of expanding access to treatment is very important for designing treatment 
strategies for the future. HAART provides a means to control the deadly effects of the virus in the short-
term – treatment reduces the morbidity of people infected with HIV and prolongs their lives 
substantially. In the medium- to long-term, sustaining access to these drugs will require increased 
resource investments as more people are able to enjoy prolonged lives due to the treatment (and will 
thus require continued access to treatment). This has high-level implications in terms of policy-making 
and resource allocation for domestic governments and external donors alike. 
 
With reference to the first research question, we want to gain an understanding of how political system 
characteristics influence HAART outcomes. Each of the institutional variables we look at speaks to an 
interesting aspect of the political environment. Regime characteristics tell us about the set of principles 
and the context within which policy-making and policy implementation take place in a given country 
(Hyden et al, 2004:2&12). For example, democratic systems might be particularly good for encouraging 
social welfare and redistributive programmes however, they may not be as effective for implementing 
policy that requires more aggressive action by government such as tax collection. In the 1990s, Uganda 
which had an authoritarian regime became a poster child for the ability of countries in the developing 
world to successfully reverse the spread of the epidemic (See Eboko, 2005; Parkhurst & Lush, 2004). 
Putzel (2003) presents that in the cases of Uganda and Senegal the provision of treatment formed part 
of an overall intervention strategy which included behaviour change and prevention objectives. Uganda 
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was able to bring a full-blown epidemic under control due to the characteristics of their leader; Senegal 
was able to intervene to stop HIV/AIDS before it reached epidemic status.5Teixeira (et al, 2003) 
discusses the efforts of the democratic government in Brazil towards providing universal access to 
antiretroviral therapy. They find that Brazil’s success in providing universal ARV therapy which began in 
the 90s was based on “a concerted early government response, a strong and effective participation of 
the civil society, a multisectoral mobilization, a balanced approach between prevention and treatment 
and a systematic advocacy for human rights in all strategies and actions” (Teixeira et al, 2003:73). Each 
of these well documented success stories were based on aggressive government action. 
 
What we see is that different political systems offer their own benefits in terms of their ability to 
respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. We can apply this information to further our understanding of why 
democracies seem to be likely to produce higher HAART policy outcomes. 
 
When looking at what Lieberman describes as politically salient ethnic boundaries we witness a different 
aspect of how political systems can influence the rollout of treatment. He finds that in countries where 
there are strong boundaries dividing people into substantial and recognizable ethnic groups, the 
epidemic is in turn understood in ethnic terms and ultimately this frame of reference becomes a political 
constraint on national policies to combat AIDS (Lieberman, 2009:3). By accounting for cultural 
fractionalization in our analysis of HAART provision we will gain insight into decision-making processes. 
For example, Wantchekon & Taylor (2007:3) describe a situation in which politically salient 
fractionalization can be both good and bad depending on the situation in that a highly fractionalized 
government (in a democracy) can translate into lively political competition and intra-party negotiation; 
whereas fractionalization can also lead to a gridlock in terms of excessive debate and delayed policy-
making processes. Lieberman (2007) as we discuss in Chapter 3 argues that race and ethnic diversity are 
important for understanding AIDS policy outcomes. Part of his argument as described in Nattrass 
(2009:4) is that governments are less aggressive on AIDS policy in ethnically divided countries because 
the disease may be conce trated among politically marginalized groups or the ruling elite may fear 
reputational damage by highlighting an AIDS crisis amongst their own supporters. We want to further 
understand these intricate relationships and their potential impact on government decision-making and 
the provision of HAART across countries.  
 
Both Uganda and Senegal’s strategies sought to direct resources to the district level and to decentralize 
the implementation of HIV/AIDS policy (Putzel, 2003:40). This was done primarily to ensure that health 
services reached those in need in the most remote district settings. However, these governments faced 
significant challenges here as they found that decentralization of health services in general was 
inappropriate in settings where capacity to implement was lacking. This is consistent with other views 
                                                          
5
 Also see Eboko (2005:45) for a discussion on the different, yet successful approaches of Uganda and Senegal 
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on decentralization of public service provision in Africa where it is found that particularly in ethnically 
diverse societies, decentralization has resulted in heightened ethnic boundaries and failure to deliver 
services to the poor as ethnic differences confound political decision-making processes (Dessy, 2007). 
South Africa and Ghana were listed as exceptions in terms of successfully decentralizing revenue 
collection and accountability. Elhiraika (2007) writes that South Africa (which we note has until recently 
performed poorly on AIDS policy) should look to further decentralize fiscal and revenue power in order 
to improve service delivery in terms of education and health services. Looking at some of the literature 
on decentralization can help us to better understand how political systems influence HAART rollout. 
There are few examples of successful service delivery interventions in Africa using decentralized 
government systems. However, it is valuable to test whether these outcomes might be different for 
HAART rollout programmes that are designed to reach local communities in rural and isolated regions of 
a country. It may also be interesting in the context of the increased emphasis by UNAIDS and major 
donors on non-governmental organisations and private donors being allowed to partner with local 
governments to deliver treatment particularly in isolated, resource-constrained settings (UNAIDS, 
2008:209). 
 
To the extent that there is a backlash against AIDS-specific funding from the international donor 
community, the spotlight will increasingly be on domestic governments to sustain and improve on the 
recent achievements in terms of providing HAART. Indeed, UNAIDS has found that “domestic 
expenditure is the largest source of HIV financing globally today, accounting for 52% of resources for the 
HIV response in low and middle-income countries” (UNAIDS, 2010:10). They argue that improving 
financing for HIV intervention programmes will require ongoing efforts to mobilize domestic resources, 
and increase the efficient use of these resources for HIV and related health and development 
programmes. Assessing the endogenous capacity of domestic governments to continue providing HAART 
to those who need it amidst growing external funding constraints can add value to the literature on 
HAART coverage. We argue that while external funding is crucial, endogenous state capacity can ensure 
that HAART programmes and health systems in general will be more sustainable in the long-term. Our 
second research question therefore looks at the capacity of country governments with a focus on the 
ability of governments to implement HAART rollout policy. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literature and the 
contribution that our paper will make; Chapter 3 looks at the relationship between political systems and 
HAART coverage; Chapter 4 presents our discussion of the relationship between state capacity and 
HAART coverage; Chapter 5 will describe our empirical model and data; Chapter 6 presents our results 
and discussions; Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of our analysis.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Empirical studies on the determinants of HAART coverage 
This section reviews the relevant literature on the determinants of HAART coverage across countries. 
We place an emphasis on aspects of previous studies that account for both political institution and 
capacity factors. The aim is to highlight where previous studies have failed to adequately account for 
factors along these two dimensions and how our analysis will add to this literature.  
 
Table 2.1 below reflects the political and capacity variables included in previous empirical analyses on 
HAART coverage as well as a brief description of the logic the authors used for including them. Signs in 
parentheses show the direction of the effects found in regression analysis and italics are used to 
highlight variables that were statistically significant in each study. The reader will note that we have not 
included financial variables such as GDP per capita, external aid, and public health expenditure in the 
column for capacity variables. While these factors are an important aspect of the ability of the state to 
implement HAART rollout policy, we classify them separately as financial or economic variables that are 
different from infrastructural and human resource capacity as we will describe in Chapter 4. 
Importantly, each of the studies reflected in the table does control for these financial variables and here 
we can focus on the other methods used in the literature to capture the impact of health sector and 
government capacity. We discuss each of the papers reviewed in the order in which they appear in the 
table.  
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Table 2.1.Political and capacity-related variables in previous empirical studies of HAART coverage 
 
 
2.2. Discussion of political factors 
Nattrass (2006) looked at the determinants of HAART coverage (for June and December2004) in a cross-
country, cross-sectional study of 77 transitional and developing countries. In her view, HAART coverage 
is a function of the socio-economic constraints and institutional capacities of different countries, and the 
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political commitment shown by national governments.6 By graphing the residuals (difference between 
actual and predicted levels of HAART coverage obtained from regression analysis), Nattrass (2006:335) 
shows that countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania performed worse than their level of 
economic development, institutional capacity and domestic epidemiological characteristics predicted. 
Interestingly these countries already had bad reputations for poor leadership and commitment on 
HIV/AIDS policy. A key assumption of her argument is that the unexplained portion of the variance in 
HAART coverage has to do with political will and commitment. Those countries with residuals larger 
than a particular threshold have performed poorly and show low levels of political commitment. 
Conversely countries that performed better than predicted were those often associated with strong, 
decisive leadership on AIDS policy (e.g. Brazil, Cambodia and Uganda). Her paper also highlights the 
centrality of economic and regional factors in determining the levels of HAART coverage. Throughout 
her analysis controlling for per capita income, national expenditure on health and whether the country 
had a democratic political regime contributed positively to HAART outcomes. The paper also found 
evidence that better outcomes could be associated with countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as well as with countries where the prevalence of HIV was higher in urban areas. 
 
In terms of political factors, Nattrass’s contributions in 2006 and 2008 account explicitly for whether a 
country was an established democracy, making the argument that established democracies were likely 
to have better functioning administrations. In her model using HAART coverage for December 2004 she 
adds that the strength of the democracy variable could reflect an implicit preference for democratic 
countries on the part of international donors, or a greater efficiency on the part of democracies to 
translate international assistance into good HAART coverage outcomes (although she adds that this 
cannot be gleaned directly from her data) (Nattrass, 2006:335). The inclusion of a variable for voice and 
accountability which is intended to represent the degree of political pressure on government does not 
contribute significantly to her model. This result may be because high levels of government 
accountability are typically associated with established democracies, and there may thus be a high 
correlation between these two ariables. Nattrass’s use of regression residuals to approximate political 
will and commitment is criticized in Schwardmann (2008). He finds that using the residuals of the HAART 
regression as an indicator of political will assumes that the original model had no errors in specification 
and that no variables were omitted (Schwardmann, 2008:7). He argues that the residual or error term 
could also be picking up measurement errors in some of the other explanatory variables which make it 
even less accurate as a predictor of political will. Nattrass (2008:3) acknowledges that the residuals 
absorb the influence of all missing variables other than political will and asserts that performance 
assessments of this kind should thus only be made for countries with residuals that are consistently 
smaller or larger than a given threshold. 
 
                                                          
6
 See also Nattrass (July, 2008:3) in which she addresses the issue of political leadership and its influence on HAART 
coverage 
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Lieberman (2007) performs a cross-sectional analysis using pooled, time-variant data for a set of AIDS 
policy response variables, and control variables including adult HIV prevalence, GDP per capita, Polity IV 
political regime score, degree of urbanization, government effectiveness, public health expenditure, and 
overseas development assistance. His work looks at developing countries with per capita incomes of less 
than US$8000, and generally excludes countries with populations of less than 500000 or those located 
outside the world regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. He includes 5 different AIDS 
policy response indicators as dependent variables – HAART coverage (2004-5), the AIDS Program Effort 
Index (API), AIDS-related government expenditure per capita, AIDS-related donor expenditure per 
capita, and the number of times HIV/AIDS was mentioned in budget speeches. In this paper, we focus on 
his model for HAART coverage. In his analysis, Lieberman finds strong evidence in support of his central 
hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on HIV/AIDS policy outcomes using each of 
the different policy measures. Specifically, he finds that HAART coverage is substantially lower in 
ethnically fractionalized countries – based on estimated parameters, and setting all other variables to 
their means he finds that “moving from the highest to the lowest level of cultural fractionalization in his 
data would shift the expected value for treatment coverage in an African country from 16.2% to 29.5%” 
(Lieberman, 2007:1425). We draw from this analysis of cultural fractionalization as a critical determinant 
of HAART coverage to add value to our understanding of how political systems and institutions affect 
HAART coverage. 
 
Lieberman (2007) does not find statistical support for the Polity IV regime-type indicator which returns a 
negative and non-significant coefficient in the HAART coverage model. However, we do think that this 
variable is an important one which we will apply in our analysis for reasons we will return to shortly.  
 
Schwardmann (2008) assesses the determinants of HAART coverage using 2006 treatment data and the 
provision of antiretroviral drugs to pregnant mothers, Mother-to-Child-Transmission-Prevention 
(MTCTP) coverage for 2005. Although we choose to focus on HAART coverage in this paper, it is 
important to note that MTCTP will often form part of an overall government treatment strategy and as 
Schwardmann notes; governments may choose to prioritize the provision of MTCTP over HAART on the 
basis of cost-effectiveness and moral judgment. His justification for this is that it is far easier to motivate 
“to save the lives of innocent babies than to extend the lives of those who may be blamed for becoming 
infected through their own behaviour” (Schwardmann, 2008:9). MTCTP can be more cost-effective 
because providing treatment to pregnant mothers at antenatal clinics focuses on a small subset of the 
infected population in a country (pregnant women) and thus requires less financial resources to 
implement. Schwardmann adds that although both HAART and MTCTP entail the intake of ARVs, MTCTP 
is a short-term treatment intervention whereas HAART is a long-term intervention. In this way, the 
analysis of determinants for HAART is different from that for MTCTP, and we choose to focus on the 
provision of HAART which has more implications for governments in terms of resources and political 
commitment, particularly in a long-term perspective. 
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Schwardmann (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis of the political determinants of HAART 
coverage in his cross-sectional analysis of countries with an HIV prevalence of above 0.1%. He includes a 
set of political variables which include a dummy variable for established democracies (as in Nattrass 
(2006)), state legitimacy, electoral accountability, press freedom, political stability, and cultural 
fractionalization. The only one of these variables which is statistically significant in his analysis is the 
democracy dummy, alongside the statistically significant controls for GDP per capita, HIV prevalence, 
the proportion of HIV positive people in urban areas, and public and external funding. We do not agree 
with Schwardmann’s approach of including such a wide set of political variables which may each have a 
strong and positive correlation with the democracy dummy (aside from cultural fractionalization which 
is also not statistically significant in his model). As we presented earlier, these variables seem to 
represent a set of general principles or values that are typical of established democracies in any case. 
Indeed, Schwardmann does concede that electoral accountability, press freedom, and political stability 
are all closely related, if not features of democracy (Schwardmann, 2008:23). Democracy can thus be 
taken as the meta institution that ‘aggregates’ the impact of electoral accountability, press freedom, and 
political stability in the model (Schwardmann, 2008:23). So even though the coefficient of 
determination, R2 (which is an indication of explanatory power in the model) increases when this full set 
of variables is included, we consider that R2 is in any case a non-decreasing function of the number of 
explanatory variables in the model and cannot be taken as an indication of the relevance of the 
additional political variables. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the 3 political variables included in our 
analysis speak to more distinct institutional aspects of political systems that can affect HAART coverage 
across countries. 
 
Nattrass (2008a) includes a broadened set of political variables in her analysis of the determinants of 
both HAART coverage for December 2006 and MTCTP coverage data for 2005. Building on her 2006 
contribution, she includes the established democracy dummy because established democracies are 
likely to have better functioning administrations than new democracies; the World Bank political 
stability indicator because stable regimes are conducive to good administration and the prioritization of 
health concerns; and a language fractionalization measure with the view that high levels of language 
diversity constrain HAART rollout by raising the cost and difficulty of providing information in more than 
one language (Nattrass, 2008a:5). Her analysis for HAART coverage finds strong statistical evidence that 
established democracies do have higher levels of HAART coverage, and that countries with high 
language fractionalization achieve lower levels of coverage. The measure of political stability has a 
positive coefficient but was not statistically significant. 
 
While we agree with the measures Nattrass includes for political stability and language fractionalization, 
we find that using a dummy variable for whether a country is an established democracy or not is limiting 
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in that it presupposes the fact that democracies are the most effective at providing HAART coverage.7It 
doesn’t add value to our understanding of how, other things equal, countries like Cambodia, Cuba, and 
Namibia that achieved HAART coverage of above 70% in 2006 were able to achieve this despite not 
being established democracies or democracies at all, or why Ghana and India which were classified as 
established democracies had only achieved 2006 HAART coverage of less than 20% (UNAIDS historical 
coverage data). Considering rationally that there are many more countries that aren’t fully established 
democracies, a thorough analysis of determinants needs to account more attentively for the likely 
HAART policy outcomes in, say, transitional regimes, new democracies or non-democratic countries. 
Indeed there are a number of approaches described in the literature for classifying countries based on 
the characteristics of the political environment in each country, some more relevant and comprehensive 
than others.8 We believe that a more comprehensive measure of regime characteristics like the Polity IV 
regime-score that provides integer scores for countries in a wide range from ‘-10’ for strong 
authoritarian regimes, to ‘+10’ for strong democracies (and scores in between for countries with a 
combination of democratic and authoritarian features) is more appropriate.  
 
What is important about the Polity IV measure is that the democratic qualities of a government are 
evaluated on a separate set of criteria including factors such as the competitiveness of political 
participation (competitive to factional) and executive recruitment (election or transitional), and the 
political constraints placed on the executive. On the other hand, autocratic characteristics are evaluated 
based on different categories specific to different degrees of autocratic regimes (repressed or 
suppressed) (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005:13). The advantage is that when the democracy and autocracy 
scales are combined into the 21-point scale by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy 
score, we can tell the difference between an autocratic government with some democratic 
characteristics and a democracy with at least some autocratic tendencies. This can add more depth to 
our analysis in terms of comparing particular features of a regime in one country to another than a 
binary dummy variable in which a country is either an established democracy, or not. By indicating the 
‘degrees’ of democracy or autocracy the Polity IV regime scores allow us to compare in a more 
comprehensive manner the performance in terms of HAART rollout of new democracies in transition, 
versus that of established democracies or strong authoritarian states which were simply grouped 
together in Nattrass’s model. Using this measure we can also test for a potential non-linear relationship 
between regime-type and HAART coverage which you can’t do with a dummy variable, a method used in 
Gizelis & Malotte (2004). We describe their methodology in section 2.3.1 below. 
 
Haacker (2009) only includes the World Bank indicator of ‘voice and accountability’ as a political variable 
in his analysis of HAART coverage for the period 2004 to 2007. Haacker (2009) includes separate 
                                                          
7
Nattrass includes this variable in both her 2006 and 2008a paper 
8
 Munck (1996) provides a detailed discussion of different conceptualisations of political regimes and 
democratisation in particular; Munck and Verkuilen (2002) provide an extensive review of alternative indices for 
measuring democracy by comparing different datasets on democracy frequently used in political science literature 
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regressions for ‘domestic’ determinants of HAART, and general determinants including external factors 
such as external donor aid. In both of these specifications, the ‘voice and accountability’ variable which 
looks at the political environment and the accountability of governments the coefficient is positive but it 
is not statistically significant. We do not consider voice and accountability in our model because much 
like the variable for electoral accountability in Schwardmann’s model, it is most likely a specific feature 
of democracy as a meta institution and will not add substantive value to our analysis which focuses on 
political systems and institutions in all regime-types. 
 
2.3. Discussion of capacity factors  
The inclusion of variables that account for the overall capacity of governments to deliver HAART is fairly 
limited if financial variables are viewed as different from infrastructural or physical capacity as we 
outline in this section. We take the view that financial or economic variables such as donor aid or public 
expenditure on health make a rollout financially feasible and form a category of their own when we look 
at the determinants of HAART coverage. Funds represent the most imp rtant means to initiate and 
sustain a rollout, but having funds alone without the necessary capacity in terms of health facilities, 
human resources, and distribution networks to ensure that antiretroviral drugs reach the people who 
need treatment decreases the likelihood of a successful rollout. The capacity requirements on 
governments in terms of providing HAART stretch well beyond procuring medicines. Stewart (et al, 
2004:8) summarizes the obstacles to the delivery of HAART in developing countries as: financial (high 
cost of providing treatment and drugs which are the largest component of total costs); organisational 
(weak health infrastructure and systems to deliver treatment); physical (lack of transport and transport 
infrastructure for people to get access to testing, drugs, and monitoring); social (discrimination and 
stigma toward people with HIV by society and treatment providers that refuse or offer sub-standard 
treatment based on this stigma). Although this list is not exhaustive, it provides an indication of the fact 
that providing an effective HAART rollout programme requires organisational and physical state capacity 
outside of the financial requisites. Adequate clinics, hospitals, nurses and physicians are just as 
important as the transport networks that enable an effective domestic drug supply-chain and allow 
people to reach testing and treatment centers.  
 
The studies included in Table 2.1 almost exclusively look at the percentage of births attended by skilled 
health personnel, and the World Bank government effectiveness indicator as measures of capacity. 
Nattrass (2006 & 2008a), Schwardmann (2008), and Haacker (2009) each include the health personnel 
variable which essentially serves as a proxy for the reach and (human resource) capacity of the health 
sector – only Nattrass (2006) finds that this variable is statistically significant. Examples of Namibia 
(Benavides, 2007), Botswana (Stewart et al, 2004), Malawi and Ethiopia (AIDS Map, 2008) consistently 
highlight the importance of human resources for health in HIV intervention and treatment provision. In 
Nigeria, human resources and finances were found to be critical to increasing treatment coverage 
(Kombe et al, 2004). However, we do not agree that an indicator for the number of births attended by 
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skilled personnel is the best available proxy for the overall reach and capacity of the health sector for 
providing HAART. The number of births (and thus the number of these attended by skilled personnel) 
pertains to a small, non-representative subset of the proportion of people in a country that need 
treatment overall. Indeed, both Nattrass (2008a) and Schwardmann (2008) only find this variable to be 
positive and statistically significant in their respective regressions using MTCTP coverage (2005 data) as 
a dependent variable. We take the view that a broader indicator such as the number of nurses or 
physicians available per 1000 people in the population is more applicable in the case of HAART provision 
which typically requires more resources to reach a broader population than providing MTCTP treatment, 
particularly in countries with large epidemics. 
 
Haacker (2009) looks at both treatment coverage and the share of people receiving treatment as a share 
of the country’s population, and finds that human resource capacity in the health sector produces 
ambiguous outcomes. We would expect that having more physicians available in a country will have a 
positive relationship with HAART coverage as they provide the human resources for implementing a 
rollout, and they can also be good lobbyists to government for further treatment intervention which 
should produce greater HAART coverage outcomes (Schwardmann, 2008:12). However, Haacker (2009) 
finds that for a small sample of 37 low-income countries, the number of nurses per 1000 inhabitants has 
a negative impact on treatment coverage yet the number of doctors has a non-significant positive 
relationship. On the other hand for an expanded sample of 80 countries including wealthier developing 
countries he finds a non-significant positive coefficient for the number of nurses and a statistically 
significant negative impact of having more physicians in the health sector (Haacker, 2009:25). He 
concludes that these peculiar results reflect differences in the levels of development and the fact that 
human resource constraints are far more pronounced in the low-income countries which he looks at 
where the ratio of nurses to doctors tends to be much higher (2009:28). Most importantly these two 
variables have some unique impact on HAART coverage, and thus we include the number of physicians 
and nurses as important components of our index of state capacity which we discuss in Chapter 4. 
 
Nattrass (2006), Lieberman (2007) and Haacker (2009) each include the World Bank government 
effectiveness indicator in their analysis of HAART coverage and it is found to have a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. The government effectiveness indicator was generally included as a 
proxy for government capacity in these studies and it is expected that countries perceived to have 
effective governments in terms of implementing policy overall will likely achieve higher levels of HAART 
coverage. By definition it measures the competence of the bureaucracy in policy formation and 
implementation, the quality of the public service, and the credibility of government’s commitment to 
policies based on a range of sources and underlying variables (Kaufmann et al, 2005; and Lee & 
Whitford, 2008). In this way government effectiveness relates to the institutional and bureaucratic 
capacity of government to implement HAART policy. More than funding, an effective rollout requires a 
government to have a comprehensive national strategy for implementation and the bureaucratic 
capacity to coordinate a multisectoral programme.  
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The advantage of the WB measure of effectiveness is that updated data are readily available for most 
countries.9A concern with this measure for our purpose is that as with many other composite measures, 
the government effectiveness index can also be criticized for relying heavily on a range of subjective 
views from respondents in different countries. This draws into question the comparability of results 
from different countries (even though the survey questions are similar) - to quote from Lee & Whitford 
(2008:10), “the index is constructed from multiple items, multiple respondents, and multiple survey 
houses and was carried out in multiple countries”. Although the index has the advantage of capturing a 
greater amount of detail about the complex dynamics of government performance, the subjectivity in 
terms of understandings of effectiveness and potential bias among government respondents particularly 
must be taken into consideration when applying it to our analysis. We should at least be cautious to 
compare government effectiveness scores across countries. Despite these concerns, the government 
effectiveness indicator is widely applied in economic and political science literature such as the papers 
referred to in this section and we apply it to our analysis of the determinants of HAART coverage as a 
component of our state capacity index.  
 
As we have described in this section, there are a limited number of measures of state capacity that are 
applied to the analysis of HAART coverage. Of the papers reviewed, there is a bias towards indicators of 
human resources for health, and a lot less is said about other forms of state capacity such as transport 
infrastructure. As we discuss in Chapter 4, there is scope to draw from broader measures of domestic 
state capacity than those discussed in this section in our analysis of the determinants of HAART 
coverage.  
 
2.4. Other relevant literature 
In this section we consider two studies on the determinants of HIV policy outcomes to specifically 
highlight how they have addressed political systems and state capacity as explanatory variables, and 
aspects of their respective approaches that can be applied to our analysis. Our discussion focuses on the 
analyses of Gizelis and Malotte (2004), and Price-Smith (et al, 2004). It is important to bear in mind our 
earlier discussion of the differences between studies of prevention and treatment strategies.  
 
Gizelis and Malotte (2004) apply a time-series cross-sectional model on a sample of 117 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1987 to 2000, to evaluate how a variety of domestic factors 
influence the HIV infection rate as a dependent variable across countries. They calculate their 
dependent variable by taking the annual number of new infections and divide this by the country’s 
population to get a per capita rate of infection for each country. Of particular interest for our purpose 
                                                          
9
 Available: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance 
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are their applications of the Polity IV regime classification (which Lieberman (2007) also included) and 
their measurement of state capacity using political extraction. Political extraction is estimated using the 
ratio of a state’s actual government revenue to the predicted revenue.10 The estimated ratio is a 
measurement of the ability of governments to penetrate society and to extract resources measured 
over time with data available for the years 1960 to 2000 (Gizelis & Malotte, 2004:15). Their argument on 
state capacity is that states with “higher levels of political extraction are more efficient at implementing 
policies, not only because they acquire more resources, but also because the state mechanisms are 
more efficient in accessing the population” (Gizelis & Malotte, 2004:15). On political regimes, they 
hypothesize that democracies tend to be more efficient and responsive to the needs of the population 
and in this way more they are more effective at reducing the spread of HIV. They also test the 
hypothesis that countries ranking high on democracy on the Polity IV classification, or high on 
authoritarianism tend to have higher levels of state capacity and a lower rate of new infections. They 
test for this effect using the square of the Polity IV regime score to emulate a non-linear relationship 
between political regime classification and rates of new HIV infections (ibid, p. 16).  
 
Their primary findings were that state capacity was associated with lower rates of HIV infection and that 
political regimes had an inverted-U relationship with the rate of new infections (Gizelis & Malotte, 
2004:19). In this sense, countries with strong democratic characteristics, as well as those with strong 
autocratic characteristics showed better results in terms of slowing the HIV infection rate. 
 
Although the authors focus on new infections which relate to HIV prevention strategies and not 
treatment intervention, we draw two important insights from their analysis. The first is that broad 
measures of state capacity such as political extraction can be applied to the analysis of AIDS policy 
outcomes, and potentially HAART coverage. In terms of our research questions, we can expect to find 
that countries with high levels of state capacity will tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage. We 
do not apply their measure of political extraction because data is mostly available up to 2000, whereas 
the scaled up provision of HAART globally applies more to the period after the UNGASS declaration in 
2001. Instead as previously outlined, we use a measure of tax revenue as a share of GDP, and the state 
capacity index which we draw from Price-Smith (et al, 2004) discussed below, and discuss further in 
Chapter 4. The second approach that we draw from the analysis in Gizelis and Malotte (2004) pertains to 
domestic political institutions and our research question on how political institutions work to enable 
better HAART coverage outcomes. Specifically, the authors introduced the square of the Polity IV regime 
classification to test whether there may be a non-linear relationship between their dependent variable 
and the type of political regime. In our analysis we would want to see whether there is any evidence to 
suggest that a non-linear relationship exists between HAART coverage and political regimes such that 
highly authoritarian systems are also likely to result in higher HAART coverage compared to 
                                                          
10
 Predicted revenue is estimated using the following regression equation: Tax/GDP =  0 + 1*(Time) + 
2*(Mining/GDP) + 3*(Agriculture/GDP) + 4*(Exports/GDP) + e 
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democracies. We present a discussion on this in Chapter 3 and test for this relationship in our statistical 
model.  
 
Price-Smith (et al, 2004) sought to address the question of why some countries had successfully 
combated the spread of the AIDS epidemic by reversing the rate of new HIV infections (or incidence), 
while others had not.11Again this approach looks at HIV infection which is mainly part of prevention 
intervention but there are elements of this approach that we can extrapolate to our analysis of HAART 
coverage. The study assesses a sample of 50 UN member states affected by the AIDS crisis. In this study 
the authors created an ‘HIV/AIDS adaptation variable’ which was “measured as the percent change from 
the historical maximum of HIV incidence in each nation”, which was used as the dependent variable 
(Price-Smith et al, 2004:152). In their view, countries that had successfully adapted to HIV were those 
that had experienced a decline in the rate of HIV incidence from the historical maximum (apex) of HIV 
incidence in that country – the apex is an inflection point after which HIV incidence declines.  A score 
was given based on ‘how much’ incidence had decreased compared to its highest level (historically) in a 
particular country. By way of example, a country that had a historical HIV incidence rate maximum of 
10% in a previous year and had successfully reduced the HIV incidence rate to 8% for a subsequent year 
(a reduction of 20%); would have an HIV/AIDS adaptation score of 20. A country that does not see a 
decline in the rate of new infections is categorized as a mal-adaptor and receives an AIDS adaptation 
score of zero (Price-Smith et al, 2004:152).  
 
Our focus will be on the state capacity index introduced as an explanatory variable in Price-Smith (et al, 
2004). The index they develop is a composite measure of the state’s capacity based on a series of 
weighted and standardized variables reflecting a country’s resources, infrastructural capabilities, and 
performance of government functions (Price-Smith et al, 2004:151). It represents a resource-centered 
approach to measuring state capacity by accounting for aspects of endogenous state ability to 
implement policy in the form of infrastructure, human capital and economic development. The authors 
argue that the ability of a country to adapt to the epidemic is dependent on its levels of endogenous 
capacity (as measured by the index) in terms of economic, infrastructural, and human resource 
capabilities. The index includes variables for: Gross National Income per capita, government 
expenditure, school enrollment, military spending, physicians per 100000, telephones per 100000, and 
the percentage of paved roads in the country. Each of these pertains to an aspect of state capacity. 
Using a tentative set of weights for each variable, the authors use Principal Component Factor Analysis 
(PCFA) to rank the variables based on how much of the variance in the data they each explain. The 
authors use this method to confirm their preliminary weighting scale for the index and to summarize 
which of the variables are closely related to the underlying concept of state capacity based on a 
correlation matrix. This analysis found that the five variables essential for economic development were 
ultimately the most significant in defining state capacity i.e. school enrolment, roads paved, physicians 
                                                          
11
 According to UNAIDS, HIV incidence (sometimes referred to as cumulative incidence) is the number of new cases 
arising in a given period in a specified population (UNAIDS Terminology Guidelines 2008). 
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per 100000, telephones per 100000, and GNI per capita (Price-Smith et al, 2004:158). Applied to the 
AIDS adaptation variable, the index was found to have a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with the AIDS adaptation variable (based on HIV incidence) in their regression analysis. 
 
The index doesn’t purport to account for anything other than the actual resources which the state has to 
implement policy with. This is both advantageous and limiting. While the simplicity of the index is 
encouraging, Price-Smith (et al, 2004:156) do concede from its application that it doesn’t sufficiently 
account for political will and community mobilization that are viewed as critical to the success of a 
national AIDS response. It is however still useful in controlling for the pragmatic ability of a country to 
respond to the AIDS epidemic. We are of the view that an index of state capacity such as this one can be 
used to address our research question regarding HAART coverage. We have described HAART as a 
resource-intensive policy programme that requires a wide range of (domestic) financial, organisational 
and infrastructural capabilities in order to provide treatment to those who need it. A measure such as 
this allows us to use proxies for these exact aspects to assess each country on their endogenous 
capacity, and then apply this to test our hypothesis that countries with high levels of state capacity are 
able to achieve higher outcomes in terms of HAART coverage. Using this as motivation and the 
methodology described above, we create our own state capacity index using a different combination of 
variables. Our index is described in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
2.5. Contributions to the literature on HAART coverage 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the determinants of HAART coverage across 
countries. The two research questions which we seek to answer were clearly outlined as follows: 
 
1. How do political institutions work to enable better HAART coverage outcomes? 
2. Do countries with higher levels of state capacity as measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP 
or an index of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage?   
 
These questions form the basis of what we hope to contribute to the literature on HAART coverage. We 
hope to add to the understanding of how domestic factors in terms of political systems and endogenous 
state capacity are critical to effective HAART rollout.  
 
In relation to political factors we shift away from the convention of including a wide set of controls for 
factors that are effectively normative features of a democratic environment such as electoral 
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accountability and press freedom.12These political variables do not really emphasize pragmatic 
influences on government decision-making and implementation such as whether to devolve political 
decision-making authority to sub-national government levels, or whether the leader of a minority ethnic 
grouping will risk reputational damage by highlighting the need for a HAART rollout programme 
amongst his own people. For this reason, we look at three targeted political variables that we believe 
speak directly to how political systems function to affect decision-making and implementation of HAART 
rollout programmes as discussed in Chapter 1. From the literature, we draw from analyses that have 
applied the Polity IV regime classification indicator which is more comprehensive in how it accounts for 
characteristics of a political system in terms of decision-making and powers of authority. We also draw 
from the views on fractionalized societies and how politically salient ethnic and cultural differences 
impact directly on the decision-making processes of governments regarding HAART rollout programmes. 
We then introduce a new aspect of how political systems function to implement HAART rollout policy by 
including a discussion on decentralization. 
 
In terms of state capacity, we introduce two new indicators of state capacity to the literature on the 
determinants of HAART, namely tax revenue as a share of GDP and a state capacity index. We take the 
view that the government effectiveness indicator used in the literature only reflects a narrow aspect 
(bureaucratic and administrative) of the broader capacity of the state to implement policy. We believe 
that our index of state capacity provides a broader perspective – by including government effectiveness 
and indicators of health sector personnel alongside other proxies for state capacity, we will gain a more 
accurate perspective of the capacity of a country to implement HAART policy.  
 
                                                          
12
See Hyden et al (2004:1) on the tendency towards normative assumptions and preferences in studies of 
democracy. 
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3. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND HAART COVERAGE 
This chapter sets out the arguments pertaining to how political systems work to enable higher HAART 
coverage outcomes. In our view, increasing access to HAART is about government decision-making, 
resources, and implementation. In the introduction to this paper we presented the view that an analysis 
of political factors as determinants of HAART coverage needs to focus on how decisions are made and 
how they are implemented to ensure an effective rollout. We therefore delineated a limited set of 
factors that we consider as relevant to the discussion of political systems, decision-making and 
implementation, namely: political regime, cultural fractionalization and government centralization. This 
chapter systematically discusses each of these aspects in turn and details how they ultimately impact on 
the levels of HAART coverage across countries.  
 
3.1. Political regimes and their impact on HAART coverage 
Political regime-types are the context within which policy-making and implementation take place – they 
guide the process at large (Hyden et al, 2004:2&12). Contrary to the UNDP view that the best form of 
good governance is democratic governance (quoted in Strand et al, 2004:61), this definition does not 
suggest that one form of political regime-type is necessarily better than another at managing policy-
making and implementation processes. The effect of political regimes on policy is indirect in that 
political regimes only shape the environment in which policy decisions are made. According to Munck 
(1996), political regimes have both a procedural and behavioural dimension; the procedural element 
pertains to the formal or informal rules that “determine the number and type of actors who are allowed 
to gain access to the principal governmental positions, the methods of access to such positions, and the 
rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions” (Munck, 1996:8). The behavioural 
dimension refers to how these rules are then accepted by major political actors. For instance, in a 
democracy the political actors are the leaders of the different political parties elected through 
competitive elections the results of which are generally accepted by the opposition. In an authoritarian 
regime there is a ruling elite closely linked with the military and decisions are made to maintain patron 
relations with the elite class. It is within this framework that policy-making and implementation take 
place – for instance, in a democracy elected political actors have a political incentive to compete for 
votes to retain political power and support of different social groupings and as such we can expect that 
redistributive social provision will increase and policy provisions to cater for the interests of different 
social groups are likely to be prioritized.  
 
The evidence presented in the preceding chapter does suggest that established democracies tend to 
achieve higher HAART outcomes than other regime-types (Nattrass, 2006 & 2008a; Schwardmann, 
2008). It is thus important for us to develop a further understanding of why democracies are likely to 
result in higher HAART coverage outcomes in terms of their decision-making processes and 
implementation; and why other regimes do not seem to achieve the same policy outcomes? The 
importance of this critical analysis is well articulated by Per Strand on AIDS governance as follows:  
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“Analyses of AIDS governance should also include impact studies - analyses of causality. They must seek to clarify 
what impact different governance responses have on the epidemic. Analytically, we should think of AIDS 
governance as a variable and not as a postulated ideal. Our analyses should frame AIDS governance as an 
independent variable that potentially can explain some of the differences in degrees of effectiveness of 
government responses (Strand, 2007:3).” 
 
Translating this to our analysis of HAART; the political factors which we account for in our analysis must 
speak directly to how political systems and governance structures actually result in variations in the 
levels of HAART coverage across countries. To answer these questions, it is best to provide a generalized 
definition of democracy in order to frame our discussion of its interaction with HAART programmes. In 
an exploration of democratization in Africa, Alison Ayers states:  
 
“According to the orthodoxy, democracy comprises: the periodic election of political representatives via credible 
multiparty elections and a universal franchise; constitutionalism, the rule of law and a particular conception of 
‘human rights’; ‘good governance’, characterized by minimal, ‘neutral’, accountable, transparent and participatory 
government with an effective bureaucracy; and a pluralist, ‘independent’ civil society“ (Ayers, 2006:323). 
 
This description characterizes democracy as an inclusive and participatory political system in which 
decision-making is premised by a body of legal rules and constitutionalized human rights principles with 
entrenched structures of political accountability. In our view, providing and expanding access to 
treatment as we’ve described above is about taking decisions to implement or expand a rollout 
programme, and implementing those decisions effectively. In this way, there are some obvious 
synergies between democracy as defined above, and what it takes to provide access to treatment. In 
terms of political factors, we believe that at a high-level, government makes the decision to provide 
treatment on the basis of constitutional human rights to health, the demands of the voting public and 
the threat of electoral and civil accountability should they not provide adequate leadership in terms of 
combating the epidemic. Their ability to implement this decision then relies on an effective bureaucracy 
and good governance systems, as well as the resources and capacity available to the domestic 
government for implementing a rollout based on funding and state capacity which we discuss in the 
following chapter.  
 
The mechanisms described here are revelatory in terms of enhancing our understanding of how 
democratic political regimes enable better HAART coverage policy outcomes. A good example of how 
these mechanisms between democracy and HAART coverage outcomes might work is that of post-1994 
South Africa. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a civil activist organisation in South Africa, was able 
to pressure the South African government into instituting a full-scale HAART rollout. The organisation 
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mobilized large sections of society including groups of those living with HIV and those affected by the 
epidemic to protest against the government’s inaction and lack of delivery of comprehensive treatment 
and care. They achieved this through a combination of mass action, civil disobedience campaigns, and 
legal action as described in Willan (2004) and Mackintosh (2009). In 2001, TAC even launched a legal 
case against the government that made it all the way to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that 
government had to provide MTCTP with immediate effect (Mackintosh, 2009:18). The ANC government 
in South Africa won the elections in April 2004 with a 69.68% majority despite broad criticism of its 
policies on AIDS (Willan, 2004:1). There was also widespread criticism of President Mbeki’s questionable 
stance on HIV/AIDS, in which he was described as an AIDS dissident or denialist (Mackintosh, 2009:5). 
Willan (2004:2) presents the view that part of the reason for the ANC retaining a great deal of support 
through the 2004 elections despite heavy criticism was because it had finally agreed late in 2003, under 
significant social pressure and in view of the looming elections, to initiate a full-scale HAART rollout.   
 
We see in this instance that government ultimately responded to the views and demands of civil society 
and the voting public. They made a decision under significant pressure to adhere to the legal and 
constitutional rights to health; under the threat of electoral accountability should they not act to 
provide treatment. Even in Brazil, as we described in the introduction, the provision of HAART was based 
on concerted government action, strong participation of civil society, an inclusive multisectoral 
mobilization, and advocacy for human rights. While the examples of South Africa and Brazil may lie at 
the extreme in terms of how democratic processes such as electoral accountability might influence 
government decision-making in terms of providing treatment, they serve to highlight a very important 
point for our analysis: democratic systems tend to incorporate a range of decision-making and 
accountability structures that make it more likely that the domestic government will be responsive to 
the demand and need for HAART. Indeed, it is a widely held view that democracies are typically more 
responsive to the needs of their constituents and therefore more accomplished in the provision of 
public goods (Coopamah, 2008:10; Haven & Patterson, 2005:80; Strand et al, 2004:56). There is certainly 
some agreement in the literature on the positive effect of democratic governance on AIDS policy 
outcomes in general, and some of these discussions are relevant for the provision of HAART coverage as 
well. These effects include but are certainly not limited to the following: 
 
 A government that demonstrates a high regard for human rights will typically prioritize the 
needs of minority groups and those who are often discriminated against including people 
living with HIV/AIDS (Hsu, 2004:3). Nelufule (2003:2) states that a common respect for the rule 
of law and the protection of human rights offer the opportunity for HIV to become an openly 
discussed issue which could serve to reduce the stigma surrounding it both within the national 
leadership and amongst those living with the virus. Governments (such as in Brazil) may thus 
place a greater emphasis on providing life-saving treatment to minority groups in society and 
creating a non-discriminatory, human rights-based environment for people to come forward 
for testing, treatment and care. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THANDO VILAKAZI – VLKTHA003 – MASTERS DISSERTATION 
27 
 
 A competitive electoral process introduces social and political costs for elected officials that do 
not act to combat AIDS, particularly in countries where the prevalence of HIV is high (Nelufule, 
2004:3). Willan (2004:2) states that HIV/AIDS is increasingly more likely to become a political 
issue that affects people’s voting patterns if more people in society (including political leaders) 
experience personal loss due to AIDS (e.g. losing a family member) which is most likely in high-
prevalence countries. In countries with low or concentrated epidemics, the inclusivity and 
participatory nature of democratic systems make it more likely that the demands and need for 
treatment and care for even minority groups can be voiced and incorporated into government 
decision-making processes. 
 An active civil society and free media can enhance communication and debate on issues 
surrounding HIV/AIDS and encourage government action as we see in the example of South 
Africa. These aspects of democracy are said to enhance the conveyance of the critical concerns 
of the public to government. They can serve to promote positive discourse on HIV/AIDS but 
also place a great deal of public pressure on government to respond – which is considered 
important when it comes to HIV/AIDS policy (Coopamah, 2008:11). 
 
The points above certainly suggest that democracy is more likely to result in government action on 
HIV/AIDS, and by extension government action on providing and expanding access to treatment. In this 
way, democratic systems affect the decision-making processes of government. This provides the logic 
for why we have to control for regime-type in our analysis of the determinants of HAART, and why other 
authors throughout the literature have addressed this as well. It is however also worth noting that some 
of the views surrounding the efficacy of a democratic political system in terms of AIDS are based on 
normative views – what we expect of how things ought to be regarding democracy and AIDS.13If it is to 
add real value, our analysis of the determinants of HAART and the (potentially) positive effects of 
democracy for the provision of HAART must critically discuss this relationship based on evidence.  
 
The reality is that democracy doesn’t have a perfect score when it comes to delivering public goods and 
enhancing human development.14In an analysis of democracy in the Third World, Pinkney asserts that 
“the justification for democracy has never been simply that it offers a better means of material 
advancement, but unless it can give voters something in return for their votes, no amount of 
philosophical argument about liberty, human rights, or political choice will ensure its survival” (Pinkney, 
2004:6). Certainly in terms of AIDS, Strand (2007:1) goes so far as to state that response approaches 
framed by democratic ideals and institutions have little to show in the way of reversing the trend of the 
epidemic in Africa. On this, he adds that we must assume some political failure to respond to the 
epidemic in Africa since the late 1990s when we consider that: the epidemic has become generalized in 
the population over this period; HIV incidence remains high which signals a failure of prevention 
                                                          
13
 See Hyden et al (2004:1) on the tendency towards normative assumptions and preferences in studies of 
democracy 
14
 See for example Tsai (2006); Gasiorowski (2000); Ross (2006); Keefer and Khemani (2005) 
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interventions; and that there are still vast numbers of people suffering ill-health and often dying from 
the disease despite the availability of life-prolonging treatment (Strand, 2007:2). We now discuss some 
of the potential shortfalls of democracy in this regard. 
 
3.1.1. Potential shortfalls of democracy in providing HAART 
This section outlines some of the concerns that can arise in democratic political systems and their 
relation to AIDS policy. Many of these shortfalls as we will mention below can directly affect the level of 
HAART coverage in a country especially by making it less likely that government will prioritize the 
epidemic in their decision-making and commit resources to providing treatment. These imperfections 
challenge the view that democracy necessarily results in better outcomes in terms of HAART policy.   
 
The first point to consider is that some of the celebrated strengths of democracy could also serve as 
inhibitors to AIDS interventions. For instance, in a democracy we assume that people vote for individuals 
and organisations that best reflect their ideological and policy preferences. However, in a democratic 
country characterized by high levels of HIV/AIDS stigma it can thus occur that the majority of the voting 
public does not perceive HIV/AIDS to be a significant risk factor and therefore does not perceive the 
need for treatment to be made widely available. These voters may also feel that HIV/AIDS is a problem 
that only affects a certain minority group and doesn’t warrant the immediate attention of government 
in relation to other competing developmental priorities. In this situation the result could be that despite 
the urgency of the AIDS crisis, the issue may not feature high on the political agenda and would be 
sidelined in exchange for other priorities. For instance, in South Africa as we discussed above the ANC 
government was able to achieve an overwhelming majority in the 2004 elections despite the 
expectation that people would be alienated from the party due to their unpopular stance on AIDS.15 
 
In a resource constrained setting such as Africa, there certainly isn’t an overwhelming consensus 
amongst the citizenry about whether governments should commit more time and budgetary resources 
to combating HIV/AIDS or providing treatment. This is despite the alarming HIV prevalence rates in the 
region. The 2nd round of the Afrobarometer Surveys including 15 African countries in the period 2002-3 
reveals that “Africans are undecided about the importance of AIDS, with equal proportions advocating 
either spending more (45%) or spending less (46%)” on AIDS (Bratton et al, 2004:26). This is in response 
to questions about whether government should spend more on HIV/AIDS even at the expense of other 
priorities like education, or whether they should rather focus on solving the many other problems in the 
country (ibid, p. 26). While these opinions may be due to a number of concomitant, country-specific 
factors, they certainly provide some indication as to the disparity in popular opinion about the attention 
and resources that governments should attribute to AIDS interventions. 
                                                          
15
See Willan (2004); and De Waal (2005:2) 
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On the other hand, in a society where a significant proportion of the population wants AIDS to feature 
on the national agenda, democratic processes are no guarantee that this will happen. Post-1994 South 
Africa is a perfect example of a country that still failed to respond adequately to the epidemic even with 
a history of an active civil society, a liberal constitution and an independent media (Furlong & Ball, 
2005). This can be due to a host of political reasons. The first of these is that as Downs concludes, 
democratic governments will always act to maximize the number of votes that they receive (Downs, 
1957:137). He argues that normative theories about how democracies work ignore the fact that they are 
a set of institutions run by ‘men’, self-interested beings who typically hold selfish motives to optimize 
their private gain (ibid, p. 136). For instance, the idea that political leaders sometimes conceal truths to 
achieve a set of political objectives is not farfetched. The example of President Mbeki in South Africa 
comes to mind, where it is argued that some of his publicly-stated divergent views on HIV/AIDS and 
initiating treatment initiatives were influenced by his personal beliefs about racism, pessimistic Western 
views on Africa, poverty and inequality in South Africa (Mackintosh, 2009:21). AIDS policy in South Africa 
has improved significantly under President Zuma’s leadership since then. Leaders may also make false 
promises to achieve a set of political objectives. In this case they may announce their intentions to take 
the matter of HIV very seriously should they be elected and expand access to treatment because they 
realize that it will win electoral support. However, with these perverse incentives at play it may happen 
that they do not follow through on those promises once elected, or may not commit the full extent of 
resources to the policy. In countries where the issue of AIDS is often in the public spotlight it can be used 
as an important electioneering tool as Willan (2004) described of the ANC in South Africa above.16 
 
The centrality of participation in democratic institutions can result in long, drawn-out political debates 
and decision-making processes that delay the response of government to the epidemic. Strand (et al, 
2004:67) adds that while participation is often good for legitimacy and consensus building, it could 
prove costly and time consuming if such a consensus is not reached – and people won’t get the 
treatment they urgently require.  
 
Bor (2007:1598) suggests that there is a disincentive for political leaders to address certain matters that 
may not reach fruition in their term of democratic office. This is a particular concern with regards to 
AIDS because we expect the time horizon for its eradication to be longer than one term of political 
office. Even with HAART which has an immediate impact on the health of those who receive it, a 
government’s plans for reaching universal coverage may be for the medium- to long-term due to 
budgetary constraints and competing developmental priorities. In fact there is evidence that political 
                                                          
16
 For a perspective on how the commitment to allocate funding for an ARV rollout plan could have been politically 
motivated, see “Questions Raised About the South African AIDS Initiative”, Available online: 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jan2004/aids-j17.shtml ; Also see: “History of HIV & AIDS in South Africa”, 
Available online: http://www.avert.org/history-aids-south-africa.htm 
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priorities are often biased towards ‘targetable’ public provisions such as road infrastructure that are 
attainable in the short-term to increase the chance of re-election (Keefer & Khemani, 2005:2). In terms 
of providing treatment, we reasonably expect that in most cases a government does not plan to reach 
100% coverage in 1 year, but rather that it might make plans to increase provision incrementally over an 
extended period. For the self-interested politician it simply may not be worth embarking on an 
expansive AIDS response programme such as HAART due to the risk of failure, especially in the short 
term. 
 
A few authors have also referenced the fact that political competition may not be sufficient to ensure 
that the work of politicians in government reflects the desires of the constituency that voted them in 
(Bor, 2007:1598; Keefer & Khemani, 2005). Keefer and Khemani attribute this to the fact that once 
elected it is difficult for the voter to monitor the contribution of any one elected official which creates a 
condition of imperfect information. This means it becomes difficult to attribute credit or assign blame to 
politicians and hold them to account (Keefer & Khemani, 2005:5). If voters aren’t able to hold 
government to account then there is no political cost for non-performance and the presence of 
competition becomes inconsequential. This may be worsened by the absence of a credible or viable 
opposition to present some political threat to the incumbent government. The expectation is that 
opposition parties in democratic systems provide a crucial level of accountability for government by 
presenting a political alternative, and publicly pointing out government inaction and failure. This system 
of accountability falls apart if the governing party does not feel threatened by a serious opposition 
party, as in the case of Botswana (Coopamah, 2008:18). Therefore, while the Botswana government has 
received much acclaim for their financial investments towards addressing AIDS by providing widespread 
access to treatment, the fact that the epidemic continues to spread unabated in that country suggests 
that there is no political sanction for government should they ultimately fail to deliver real results on 
AIDS. 
 
3.1.2. HAART coverage in authoritarian regimes 
With the exception of a few countries like Uganda and Cuba which we mentioned earlier, there are very 
few countries with authoritarian governments that can claim to have successfully reversed the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. There is also very little evidence to suggest that this outcome would be any different for 
HAART coverage policy. There is some empirical evidence that authoritarian governments are able to 
achieve a great deal in terms of developmental outcomes.17It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that 
democracy is a necessary condition for rapid economic development at the expense of authoritarian 
                                                          
17
 Using a panel study of 97 underdeveloped countries Gasiorowski (2000) concludes that democracies produce 
higher inflation and slower economic growth in underdeveloped countries; Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
conclude that the effect of political regimes is a matter that is open for debate with strong arguments formulated 
in support of autocracies and democracies 
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regimes. The reality however is that there is no apparent reason to believe that an authoritarian 
government would care as much about HIV/AIDS intervention as they do about economic growth. 
 
One of the primary arguments put forward to explain the economic strengths of authoritarian regimes is 
that they have high levels of ‘state autonomy’ – the state is free to pursue development goals because it 
is relatively insulated from the interest group pressures from unions and large firms (Przeworski & 
Limongi, 1993:55). If we argue that providing and expanding access to HAART is about decision-making 
and implementation then it is not farfetched to think that an authoritarian government with a great deal 
of state autonomy is well positioned to initiate prevention and treatment interventions to control 
HIV/AIDS (which could be seen as a threat to economic development).  
 
Some authors have certainly suggested that autocratic regimes are potentially more aggressive in their 
response to the AIDS epidemic (Lieberman, 2009:52). Uganda, then under the leadership of President 
Museveni, has earned a great deal of plaudits for its success in reversing the spread of HIV in the early 
1990s. Importantly, these outcomes occurred during a time when the country embodied strong features 
of an authoritarian government.18A large amount of attention has been paid to the strength of his moral 
leadership in a time of crisis, yet very little is mentioned about the coercive forces employed to enforce 
sexual behaviour change. De Waal (2006:101) discusses the fact that in many rural areas the movements 
of young women were halted by military force (‘Resistance Councils’) if they were thought to be 
engaging in ‘socially unacceptable’ behaviour. Young women who were thought to be spreading the 
virus were threatened with violence or lynching (ibid, p. 101). This strategy began as a measure to 
prevent a civil war but emerged as a tool employed for the management of HIV. Allen (2004:1127) 
writes that in 1986 HIV positive people in Cuba were forced to live in designated sanatoriums to contain 
the spread of the virus. He adds that strategies like enforced testing and condom usage, or enforced 
compliance with antiretroviral treatment would work for reversing the effects of the epidemic. While 
these examples are primarily about prevention interventions, our point is that combating HIV/AIDS 
using any intervention strategy is about governments taking aggressive action and committing resources 
to their strategy regardless of the type of regime, just as we have seen in the examples of Brazil, Cuba, 
Thailand or Uganda.  
 
However, there are some countervailing factors in this argument. We have discussed the fact that 
although domestic governments have shown commitment in terms of funding and resources for 
providing treatment and other intervention strategies, a great deal of assistance is still sourced from 
international donors. International donors tend to be from the developed, mostly democratic states and 
as Nattrass suggested they may have an implicit preference for democratic countries in terms of which 
                                                          
18
 Uganda scored between ‘-7’ and ‘-4’ on the Polity IV indicator over this period which is generally considered a 
government with strong autocratic characteristics (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005)  
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countries they choose to fund (Nattrass, 2006:335). This can affect the likelihood that authoritarian 
governments would receive the necessary funding and assistance to expand access to treatment, for 
instance. The other consideration is that the international AIDS community advocates for a human 
rights-based approach to AIDS intervention. One of the celebrated aspects of Brazil’s campaign to 
provide universal access to treatment was the fact that it was premised on a systematic advocacy for 
human rights in all strategies and actions, which the authors add is a principle consistent with the 
undertakings of the 2001 UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on AIDS (Teixeira et al, 2003:73). The 
examples of Uganda and Cuba above clearly violate a number of democratic civil liberties.  
 
The relationship between providing universal access to HAART and human rights is critical. It is common 
knowledge that HIV/AIDS is a severely stigmatized disease. People living with HIV/AIDS are frequently 
subject to discrimination from friends, family, colleagues in the workplace, and even health care 
professionals. Discrimination and human rights abuse by health care professionals includes denial of 
care, breaches of confidentiality, and HIV testing without consent (UNAIDS, 2004). A study in Nigeria 
found that one in ten care providers reported refusing care for HIV-positive patients, 10% reported 
refusing them access to a hospital, and 20% of health care professionals felt that people living with HIV 
deserved to be infected because they had behaved immorally (UNAIDS, 2004:126). The fact that HIV 
testing is seen as a gateway or prerequisite for receiving HAART means that creating an environment 
that discourages this kind of discrimination is crucial (UNAIDS, 2004:127). It also means that providing 
treatment to those who need it is a function of human rights and a non-discriminatory societal 
environment. A non-discriminatory society can encourage more people to come forward, get tested, 
and receive treatment, particularly those people from marginalized groups such as sex workers, injecting 
drug users, and men who have sex with men. In South Africa, legal action based on human rights was a 
vehicle to enforce people’s rights to ga n access to health care, including antiretroviral treatment 
(UNAIDS, 2004:123). We note that a prioritization of fundamental human rights is a principle most 
naturally associated with democracies. 
 
If we set the examples of Uganda and Cuba aside, the issue then may not be whether authoritarian 
states could potentially deliver higher HAART outcomes, but if democratic governments tend to succeed 
in providing expanded access to HAART (as part of a national intervention strategy) when they act more 
authoritatively such as in Brazil. Strand (2007:7) creates a distinction between idealistic and 
authoritative democratic AIDS governance – where the latter refers to the legitimate limitation of one or 
more democratic principles in order to aid a more effective AIDS response by government.19In his view, 
this is in contrast to the authoritarian (or autocratic) governance of AIDS in a political system where the 
government can disregard most or all of the principles typically associated with democracy. Strand 
(2007:17) goes on to make the point that aggressive approaches to HIV governance may not even have 
                                                          
19
 This legitimacy draws from the fact that even these limitations are arrived at through democratic processes 
(electoral, legal, constitutional) which makes them consistent with democratic ideals e.g. democratic adoption of a 
strategy to institute compulsory HIV testing 
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to entail a ‘principled disregard for human rights’ but rather that as with other laws, there are often 
exceptions that can be made in health emergencies. As we have mentioned, the type of regime in a 
country provides the context in which government decision-making and implementation takes place. On 
the face of it, authoritarian governments which tend to place less emphasis on human rights are 
therefore less likely than democracies to emphasize a non-discriminatory environment in which people 
are free to come forward for testing, treatment and care. In this way, the levels of HAART coverage are 
expectedly lower under authoritarian countries. 
 
3.2. Cultural fractionalization and its impact on HAART coverage 
In earlier sections of the paper, we introduced the view that high levels of ethnic fractionalization are 
most likely to result in lower levels of HAART coverage. Indeed, evidence presented in the literature 
review confirms this. Ethnic fractionalization is widely defined as the likelihood that two people 
randomly chosen from a population will be from different ethnic groups, such that societies with many 
distinct ethnic groups will have a higher probability. This measure is simply an indicator of ethnic 
diversity, and diversity in terms of race, language or indigenous groups for instance, does not imply an 
effect on political decision-making per se. What matters most for understanding the effect of ethnic 
fractionalization (or fragmentation) in terms of political decision-making is the extent to which that 
diversity finds political salience or translates into boundary institutions – boundary institutions are the 
sets of rules and practices that give social and political meaning to group identities (Gauri & Lieberman, 
2006:47). In his book, Lieberman (2009:247) refers to this as the ‘political salience’ or institutionalization 
of ethnic differences in the political life of the country. Boundary institutions “regulate racial and ethnic 
group categories and intergroup behavior”, examples of which can include census and other protocols 
for gathering and disseminating information in terms of group identities or policies that grant access to 
political office, jobs, and certain rights of citizenship based on group membership (Gauri & Lieberman, 
2006:49). In this way, ethnic group dynamics are politically salient and can form the basis for political 
mobilization or social perceptions of shared risk in terms of a ‘new’ threat such as HIV/AIDS.  
 
Where ethnic boundaries are strong, societal groups are most likely to perceive a problem or risk such 
as HIV/AIDS along ethnic lines. In order to maintain a positive social (group) identity they are far more 
likely to associate a particular risk such as HIV with another grouping i.e. “It’s their problem/It’s not our 
problem” (Lieberman, 2009:44). This likelihood is especially high in the case of HIV/AIDS which has a 
history of being a morally stigmatized condition such that no ethnic group and no leader of an ethnic 
group would want to acknowledge that AIDS was a problem amongst their people, to protect their 
reputation. Politically salient ethnic differences can find their way into the political arena when leaders 
do not want to raise ‘unpopular’, stigmatized issues like AIDS and the importance of giving people access 
to treatment for fear of losing electoral support; or a particular ethnic grouping may not want AIDS 
policies enacted by their leaders for fear of publicly associating their grouping with the disease – “shame 
of association” (Lieberman, 2007:1414). Importantly, it is in countries where ethnic differences do have 
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some bearing on the political arena that stigma and discriminatory views based on group identity and 
the shame of association are expected to influence the actual communication of ideas about HIV/AIDS 
risks and the nature of government policy. 
 
Throughout the paper, we have developed the idea that providing universal access to HAART has a lot to 
do with government decision-making, and the effective implementation of those decisions. The 
arguments in this section suggest that a high degree of politically salient ethnic boundaries can 
negatively affect the behaviour of political leaders and government, and thus the decisions they make 
regarding AIDS interventions such as treatment. In addition to this, ethnic fragmentation can affect the 
autonomy and administrative capacity of the government by undermining government authority over 
the country when there are a number of political factions; slowing down deliberative processes and 
creating many competing interests that in turn stagnate decision-making Polidano (2000:810). While 
there is some scope to think that in a democracy, ethnic diversity could in principle lead to higher levels 
of political competition, lively debate, intra-party negotiation, and inclusivity in terms of minority group 
interests; there is very little empirical evidence in the literature to support this view. We therefore 
expect that the levels of HAART coverage are likely to be lower in countries with high levels of ethnic or 
cultural fractionalization. 
 
3.3. Government centralization and its impact on HAART coverage 
We have maintained throughout our discussion that providing HAART is about decision-making, 
resources, and implementation, and that our analysis of political factors as determinants of HAART 
coverage needs to focus on how decisions are made and how they are implemented to ensure an 
effective rollout. In this section we introduce our third factor related to how political systems work to 
enable better HAART outcomes: government centralization.  
 
A centralized government is one in which decision-making authority, revenue collection and planning 
are concentrated within a central (or federal) government. Our discussion to follow is based on the 
general premise that most developing and transitional economies have until recently had centralized 
government structures mostly inherited from a history of colonial rule. The debate about 
decentralization of government represents a shift away from this norm (Shah, 2004). Decentralization 
can be broadly defined as “the transfer of authority and power in planning, management, and decision-
making from higher to lower levels of organizational control” (Bankauskaite et al, 2004:2). In a broad 
public administration context, decentralization can mean: “delegation transfers responsibility to a lower 
organizational level; de-concentration to a lower administrative level within the same organization; 
devolution implies transferring authority to a lower political level; and privatization takes place when 
assets and/or responsibility are transferred from public to private actors” (Bankauskaite et al, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THANDO VILAKAZI – VLKTHA003 – MASTERS DISSERTATION 
35 
 
2004:2).20Our discussion does not look at each of these in turn, but rather considers each of the 
concepts as sub-categories of our main organizing concept - decentralization. The primary distinction we 
make therefore is simply between centralized or decentralized systems. From these definitions we can 
draw some obvious parallels between political decision-making and implementation for the provision of 
HAART, and the concepts related to centralization and decentralization. The concepts of authority and 
planning related to (de)centralization map directly onto our previous discussion of government decision-
making; and the concepts of management and administrative levels are closely linked to the idea of 
implementation. In our view, one of the main decisions that a government has to make regarding its 
rollout programme is whether to centralize control, funding, budgeting and strategic planning for a 
national rollout within the health ministry, or to devolve such authority to sub-national government or 
non-governmental organisations. This decision has important implications for how a rollout takes shape, 
which level of governance will be accountable for its effectiveness, and what the funding requirements 
will be.  
 
UNAIDS guidelines advocate for a centralized planning approach for AIDS intervention through the 
‘Three Ones’ principles – “one national AIDS authority, one national strategic framework, and one 
national monitoring and evaluation system” (UNAIDS, 2008:206). The UNAIDS report states that 92% of 
countries have a national AIDS authority, 97% have a multisectoral framework, and 92% have a national 
monitoring plan in place (ibid, 2008:206). The concern however is that far fewer countries have detailed 
costing and operational plans relating to each of these areas despite having the ‘Three Ones’ principles 
in place, which they argue has negative implications for the quality of implementation. Although many 
national strategies place an emphasis on multisectoral responses, in practice very few of these countries 
have devolved authority and resources beyond the health ministry to other government departments, 
sub-national government and non-governmental organisations. As a result, sub-national units face 
tremendous challenges in terms of funding and coordination, especially because donor funding and 
planning is concentrated at the national government level.  
 
On the other hand, UNAIDS also argues that decentralizing prevention and intervention programmes 
helps to empower sub-national units at the district and community level to implement programmes that 
meet local needs. An example of Ethiopia is given where the decentralization of service delivery based 
on partnerships at the district and community level dramatically increased the number of people 
receiving HAART from 8276 in 2005, to over 120000 in 2007 (UNAIDS, 2008:209). In the Mbeya region of 
Tanzania, capacity building and resource mobilization initiatives at the local government level helped 
the region to reach more than 80% of the population with basic prevention services (ibid, p.209).       
 
                                                          
20
 Original italicized emphasis  
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What we begin to see is that there is an important link between national strategies and decision-making 
under the ‘Three Ones’ principles and translating those plans into well-resourced and coordinated 
programmes at the sub-national level. Providing HAART is a resource-intensive programme that can 
require a range of provisions including laboratory and pharmaceutical services, information 
management and monitoring systems, and counseling and clinic care services (Tawfik et al, 2002:28). 
We argue that from a bureaucratic and decision-making perspective it is exceedingly difficult for a 
health ministry to coordinate such a wide range of crucial aspects from a centralized position, and being 
able to decentralize different functions to local governments and other sub-national units may make a 
rollout programme easier to carry out. But what functions of government should be decentralized for 
HAART coverage policy? In terms of the ‘Three Ones’, central government is perhaps better positioned 
to handle high-level functions such as negotiating drug prices and procurement, deciding what drug 
regimes are appropriate in terms of cost and pharmaceutical properties, setting short- and long-term 
national targets for treatment coverage, developing a system of standardization of service provision, 
developing guidelines for monitoring and evaluating national progress, sourcing funds from 
international donors and the private sector, and developing and maintaining national infrastructure such 
as hospitals and laboratory facilities. These are high-level functions that require oversight from 
government to the extent that they rely on economies of scale to reduce costs and national 
coordination to ensure that access is equitable across different areas of the country.  
 
We take the view that allowing sub-national units to decide on how funds received from national level 
and donors are allocated within their region and which areas may need more than others is critical. They 
should also have control over localized testing and treatment programmes and authority over which 
communities and community programmes present the highest demand for treatment. In this way, sub-
national units can be more flexible in terms of tailoring their strategy to meet local needs. This is 
consistent with Treatment 2.0 objective of adapting delivery systems such that further decentralization 
and integrating of service delivery at a local level is possible; and mobilizing communities and 
community organisations to assist with implementing and monitoring treatment maintenance and 
adherence programs at a sub-national level (UNAIDS, 2010:106). In this way, sub-national units are most 
relevant for implementation and administration of a national rollout programme. They should be 
empowered to make decisions that affect the rollout in localized areas, but they should also form part of 
multisectoral decision-making structures at a national level to ensure a uniform overall strategy and 
standard throughout a country. While national government will hold ultimate accountability for the 
success or failure of the national rollout, decentralizing certain functions transfers responsibility and 
accountability (in the case of elected local governments) to sub-national units and reduces the 
concentration of resources at the national level to ensure that treatment reaches those who need it.  
 
As we mentioned above, both Uganda and Senegal’s strategies sought to direct resources to the district 
level and to decentralize the implementation of HIV/AIDS policy (Putzel, 2003:40). This was done 
primarily to ensure that health services reached those in need in the most remote district settings. 
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However, we also noted that the governments in both of these countries found that decentralization 
could not work in settings where the capacity of sub-national units such as local government was 
lacking. Wunsch (1998:40) argues that effective local government performance in terms of service 
delivery is positively related to greater levels of three key factors: resources, authority, and a working, 
grassroots-based political process. In Europe, there is evidence of decentralized health systems 
improving the levels of service delivery (e.g. Spain and Italy) on the basis that: decentralization improves 
allocative and technical efficiency through better matching of public services to local preferences, and 
fewer levels of localized bureaucracy to facilitate better containment of local costs through targeted 
programmes (Bankauskaite et al, 2004:22). The evidence in Africa on the other hand suggests that 
decentralization of service delivery has often failed because many countries that decentralize authority 
and accountability have done so to militate against the effects of civil war, ethnic conflicts and political 
instability, rather than to enhance the implementation of government policy - e.g. Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Burkina Faso, and Uganda (Dessy, 2007:27).  
 
This evidence suggests that while decentralizing decision-making and implementation could have 
advantages in terms of HIV/AIDS and HAART policy as described in this section, there are intervening 
political and capacity (resource) factors that may result in less positive outcomes. Our analysis of 
decentralization in this paper will look at whether a state has a unitary or federal government as a proxy 
for the degree of sub-national government levels present in a country. The implicit assumption in our 
exploratory analysis is that countries with different tiers of decentralized government would also tend to 
use a decentralized framework for implementing a HAART rollout. From the discussion above, we can 
expect to find that decentralized (non-unitary) governments do not achieve good outcomes in terms of 
HAART due to political, resource and capacity constraints.   
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4. STATE CAPACITY AND HAART COVERAGE 
State capacity is the ability of the state to formulate and implement public policy (Weller & Ziegler, 
2008:7; Hansen et al, 2002:3). To take a narrow view, a country with high state capacity will be better 
able to effectively implement policy than a less capable country. This is not to say that states with high 
capacity can implement a whole range of policies perfectly, but rather that they are in a better position 
to be able to do so than states with lower capacity (Weller & Ziegler, 2008:5). The idea is that states with 
high capacity have the power to enact policy and they are able to exercise a fair deal of control over the 
resources to do so in a society. In this light, early conceptions of state capacity actually drew a lot from 
the idea that a state with a strong military, and control over this military, had a high level of capacity to 
decide upon and enact policy (Hendrix, 2009:3).  
 
Mann (1993) famously made the distinction between the ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ powers of the 
state as components of state capacity. In his construct, despotic power referred to the power that state 
elites held over society and the range of actions that government could undertake without routine 
negotiation with civil society (Mann, 1993:59). In other words it is the ability of leaders to act with 
autonomy, and even against the wishes of the population if necessary to achieve their objectives. 
Infrastructural power refers to the state as having the institutional abilities to penetrate social life in its 
territory and implement decisions (ibid, p. 59). In many subsequent works that reference this definition 
this has been simplified to mean the ability that the state has to extract resources from society for the 
purpose of implementing policy.21The strong state has control over societal life and can extract 
adequate resources from society to achieve its policy goals. Weak states typically rely on despotic power 
because they do not have the institutions to impose the administrative structure to extract from society 
(Hansen et al, 2002:12). Strong (democratic) developed states, for instance, are often associated with 
strong infrastructural power and weak despotic power in the sense that democratic states have 
institutional ability but are less able to act autonomously and without political restraint to achieve their 
goals (Polidano, 2000:808).  
 
If we then view the state as an institution with the autonomy and means to make decisions that affect 
all of society, then a measure of state capacity represents the extent to which they are able to do this to 
achieve economic and political goals. In her work analyzing the economic and political crisis which faced 
countries in Latin America and Africa in the 1970-80s, Merilee Grindle develops the following taxonomy 
of what capable states ought to have: 
i) Institutional Capacity: Control over the authoritative and effective ‘rules of the game’ to 
regulate economic and political interactions, conventions and norms; 
ii) Technical Capacity: The ability and human capital to manage information and effective 
macroeconomic policies; 
                                                          
21
 See for example Polidano (2000); Hansen (et al, 2002). 
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iii) Administrative Capacity: The ability to perform basic administrative or bureaucratic tasks 
essential for managing basic physical and social infrastructure; and 
iv) Political Capacity: The effective and legitimate channels for societal decision-making, 
representation and conflict resolution (Grindle, 1996:8).  
 
For this paper, it is useful to draw some similarities and linkages between state capacity and the political 
concepts developed in the preceding chapter. We have already stated that regime-type represents the 
set of political rules and overall societal context for political decision-making and implementation. We 
can easily relate Grindle’s taxonomy to our discussions of political systems and state capacity, and 
specifically to resources, political decision-making and implementation in relation to HAART policy. 
Based on this, a strong state has the autonomy from non-state actors to make decisions about political 
rules and conventions (e.g. democracy) and how they will interact in order to achieve its goals 
(institutional and political capacity). The strong state will also have the know-how and the bureaucratic 
institutions to ensure that those goals are achieved (technical and administrative capacity). In this sense 
the state formulates and implements policies. Importantly, this definition of state capacity does not 
make stipulations about the type of regime that is best able to decide upon and implement policy. This 
can be taken to mean that any country with high levels of capacity could implement its policy objectives, 
and this is not necessarily dependent on the type of regime.  
 
4.1. HAART and measuring state capacity 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, Gizelis and Malotte (2004) show that state capacity has a significant 
negative impact on HIV incidence and that countries ranking high on either democracy or 
authoritarianism have a lower rate of incidence, and higher levels of state capacity. Although we need to 
be cautious when looking at studies of prevention strategies as discussed earlier, this finding suggests 
that state actors need more than just a ‘strong will’ to achieve positive outcomes in terms of HIV/AIDS 
policy; they also need the capacity to do so. Hansen (et al, 2002:21) presents that in very poor countries 
the state “cannot provide adequate health care and public education when fiscal resources are virtually 
nonexistent”. Andrew Price-Smith and his colleagues make a similar point when they conclude the 
following:  
 
“States with low endogenous levels of capacity, measured in terms of economic power, infrastructure, and human 
capital indicators, will theoretically experience far greater difficulty in generating effective adaptive 
countermeasures to the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (Price-Smith et al, 2004:150). 
 
In each of these references to capacity, the resources that the state is able to control are central to its 
ability to enact policy – this is particularly the case for AIDS policy. With regards to HAART, Nattrass 
(2008b:9) describes how governments have a role to play in a range of areas such as negotiating for 
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lower drug costs, bolstering laboratory capacity, streamlining drug distribution channels, ensuring that 
there is trained health personnel and designing the overall rollout programme. It is evident that 
performing these tasks requires government to have the wherewithal and decisive authority to make 
things happen.  
 
From a pragmatic point of view, a government would surely not take the risky decision to embark on an 
extensive HAART roll-out with the knowledge that it did not have the capacity to do so. A large part of 
that capacity as we’ve seen is the actual resources or revenue extracted from society. In a paper about 
the determinants of public spending, Dudley and Montmarquette (1992:522) propose that “rational 
agents will take account of the expected cost of financing public spending in determining their desired 
levels of government expenditure”. Similarly, Berry and Fording (1997:159) analyzing American states 
found that the level of state economic resources was a critical determinant of policy choices and the 
behaviour of government elites. It is particularly important in the case of HAART that adequate financial, 
infrastructural, and human capital resources are available to ensure the sustainability of treatment 
provision in the long-term, especially as more people gain access to it. A discontinuity in the access to 
treatment for an HIV-positive patient (caused by state resource constraints) could impact negatively on 
the effectiveness of further regimens of treatment. An effectiv  HAAART programme requires high 
levels of adherence and continuity to prevent viral progression, prevent drug resistance from 
developing, and to ensure reliable viral suppression (Mills et al, 2006:679). It is thus essential that a 
government is able to follow through on an ARV rollout strategy once it is initiated, particularly in 
resource-constrained settings. 
 
This raises the discussion of whether state capacity can be measured and how this can be done. As with 
many concepts in political science, state capacity is an incredibly dynamic concept that has no direct 
measure. The concept is dynamic because different countries may have strong capacity in different 
areas such as their bureaucracy or level of infrastructure, and these characteristics are constantly 
changing over time as cou tries develop economically. However, there are some indicators that have 
been developed to approximate the level of capacity that a country has. In this paper we focus on tax 
revenue as a share of GDP and an index of state capacity. 
 
4.1.1. Tax revenue as a share of GDP 
In many applications of state capacity theory, a measure of the level of taxation is used. This approach 
was originally developed during times of war where tax revenue provided the resources to sustain the 
war effort and stronger states were those that had developed the systems and institutions to extract the 
revenue and resources needed from society (Besley & Persson, 2007:2). In contemporary studies 
taxation is seen as an indirect measure that “is the mirror of the relation between the government and 
the society” (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999:391). In this sense, studying taxation is able to reveal aspects of both 
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the economic and political life of a country. This is because taxation reveals the (despotic) ability of 
government to extract economic resources from society even if there is societal resistance; and through 
tax compliance society’s acceptance of that state’s authority is revealed i.e. legitimacy (Lieberman, 
2002:91; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Arbetman-Rabinowitz et al, 2007:4). Many studies have used ‘total tax 
revenue taken as a percentage of GDP’ or  ‘income tax revenue divided by total tax revenue’ as 
measures of state capacity.22 
 
Weyland (1996) quoted in Weller and Ziegler (2008:7) proposes that “if a state has the capacity to 
implement policy, this should be visible in the effective collection of taxes”. Measuring income tax to 
proxy for state capacity is advantageous because firstly, collected taxes represent an actual outcome of 
a state policy (to collect taxes), and income tax is known to be particularly difficult to collect relative to 
other forms of taxation (Weller & Ziegler, 2008; Lieberman, 2002:99). So essentially if the state performs 
well in this regard, it serves as an indicator of their ability to implement other complex policies e.g. the 
rollout of HAART. Of course in addition to this, a large pool of collected tax revenue theoretically 
increases the resources available to the state to implement policies in general. The challenge with using 
total and income taxation as measures is that this data is difficult to obtain for underdeveloped 
countries, where HIV prevalence is generally highest. These narrow taxation measures are also difficult 
to use in cross-national studies because a few countries in the developing world rely on oil and resource 
revenue. These countries place very little emphasis on income and property tax and instead draw 
revenues from exports channels (which are seen to be easier revenue sources to manage 
bureaucratically). This gives a slightly limited indication of the actual administrative and implementation 
ability of the state (Lieberman, 2002:98). It is however important to conduct some exploratory analysis 
of the relationship between tax revenue as a share of GDP and HAART coverage, which is included in the 
empirical model. We expect to find that higher levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP as a proxy for 
state capacity will be associated with higher levels of HAART coverage.  
 
4.1.2. State Capacity I dex 
The state capacity index developed in Price-Smith (et al, 2004) is briefly described in Chapter 2. In this 
section we develop our own state capacity index drawing from the statistical technique used in Price-
Smith (et al, 2004). Our approach is different from theirs in that we have selected a different set of 
variables which we see as the best proxies for state capacity; and we will also apply a different set of 
weights for the variables in our analysis using a different technique to the one used in Price-Smith (et al, 
2004) where they applied their own theorized weighting system. Instead of applying our own theorized 
weights, we will use the factor loadings generated from PCFA as the relevant weights for our variables in 
the index. This is in order to ensure that our index accurately reflects the significance of each observed 
variable to components of state capacity as described below. The analysis below is thus our own and 
draws from the general methodology in the Price-Smith (et al, 2004) paper. 
                                                          
22
 For some examples see Lieberman (2002); Fauvelle-Aymar (1999); Weller and Ziegler (2008); Hendrix (2009) 
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Principal-Component Factor Analysis (PCFA) is used which serves two important purposes in this 
analysis. The first is that as a variable reduction technique, PCFA can be used to summarize our observed 
variables and discern which of these variables best proxy for state capacity, based on an adjusted 
correlation matrix. The second purpose is that PCFA identifies (the number of) latent factors within the 
data not directly measured that underlie the set of variables i.e. underlying themes or concepts 
(DeCoster, 1998).23Figure 4.1 presented below from DeCoster (1998) illustrates the idea that the 
observed variables (measures 1 to 5) are influenced in part by underlying common factors (factors 1 and 
2) and in part by underlying unique factors specific to each observed variable (E1 to E5) (DeCoster, 
1998:1), in what is called the Common Factor Model. Factor analysis therefore summarizes underlying 
patterns and correlations within the set of observed variables into factors that capture those patterns 
which cannot be measured explicitly. 
  
                                                          
23
 See the following for descriptions and discussions of Factor Analysis and its applications: Suhr (2005) compares 
FA with Principal Component Analysis; StatSoft (2010) for mathematical background and explanations   
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Figure 4.1. The Common Factor Model 
 
Source: DeCoster (1998:1) 
 
By hypothesizing the underlying concepts between the different proxies for state capacity, PCFA clarifies 
which of the variables we select are the best proxies for state capacity and whether there are 
commonalities (latent factors) amongst these variables. The underlying concepts or themes within the 
variables are represented as factors. The observed variables are linear combinations of these underlying 
factors and some unique factors (including some measurement error in the observed variables). These 
underlying factors can then be converted into factor scores that are often used as variables in other 
analyses for instance – this can be done based on a theorized weighting system such as in Price-Smith 
(et al, 2004) where they used their own hypothesized weights or weights based on factor loadings as we 
will do for our index. This is why PCFA is a popular method in the construction of indices and the analysis 
of questionnaire survey data. As mentioned, we use a different set of variables to those used in Price-
Smith (et al, 2004).   
 
An important precondition for performing PCFA is that the observed variables are first standardized 
using Z-scores such that they have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This transformation 
eliminates the influence of variables with large magnitudes over those with smaller magnitudes.24The 11 
variables we include are presented below in Table 4.1 along with the results from the factor analysis. All 
variables are sourced from the World Bank WDI using the most recently available data over the period 
1999-2008, unless otherwise stated. The variables have been chosen as general markers of the capacity 
of the state to respond to crisis and to manage and implement policy. In this way they are certainly 
applicable to our second research question which analyzes the effect of state capacity on HAART 
coverage.  
                                                          
24
 See StatSoft (2010:83) for the mathematical derivation and explanation of Z-scores  
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Table 4.1. State Capacity Index Variable Descriptions25 
Variable  Capacity Index Description 
Government effectiveness26 Competence of the state bureaucracy and 
quality of the public service 
Secondary school enrolment (% of 
gross)27 
Represents education as a core function of a 
capable state and a measure of human capital 
Telephone lines per 100 people Proxy for the communication, infrastructural  
and technological sophistication of the state 
Sustainable access to improved water 
source (% of population)28 
Represents infrastructural capacity and level of 
development (also essential for public health) 
Physicians per 1000 people29 Represents the general level of health care 
infrastructure and human capital capacity 
Nurses per 1000 people30 Represents the general level of health care 
infrastructure and human capital capacity 
Hospital beds per 1000 people31 Represents the physical health sector 
infrastructure capacity 
Roads paved (% of total roads)32 Proxy for transport and physical state 
infrastructure 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ Level of economic development and overall 
economic capacity   
Tax revenue as a % of GDP33 Indicates state extractive and administrative 
power and level of resources available for 
government spending; broad indicator of 
overall state capacity 
Military expenditure as a % of GDP Indicates state ability to protect territory and its 
control over the use of force to achieve its 
objectives (despotic power) 
 
The results of the PCFA are presented in Table 4.2: 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Variables different from those in Price-Smith (et al, 2004) are italicized  
26
 Kaufmann et al (2009); Quality of Governance Dataset (Teorell (et al, 2010)) 
27
 Additional data is sourced from UNESCO and UNICEF; Available online: www.childinfo.org/  
28
 Measures share of the population with sustainable access to an improved water source (%) 
29
 WHO World Health Statistics 2009. Most recently available data for the period 2000-2009. Available online: 
http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html 
30
 WHO World Health Statistics 2009. Most recently available data the period 2000-2009. Available online: 
http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html 
31
 Sourced from WHO; Available online: www.who.int/nha/en  
32
 Sourced from WDI Online; Most recently available data for the period 1999-2007 
33
 Sourced from the WDI Online and IMF Article IV Country Reports; Available online: www.imf.org  
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Table 4.2. Principal-Component Factor Analysis using Markers of State Capacity34 
 
As mentioned above, each factor represents an underlying concept (or pattern) within the observed 
variables that we have chosen as the best proxies for state capacity. The factors together are the 
components of state capacity. Eigenvalues indicate the amount of variance explained by each factor or 
in other words the number of variables represented by each factor. The Eigenvalue-One Criterion 
requires that only those factors that have an eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1 are retained, in this 
case factor 1, 2 and 3. An eigenvalue of 5.70 on factor 1 basically means that the factor represents as 
much of the variance as 5.70 of the 11 original variables. Similarly, factors 2 and 3 represent as much 
variance as just over 1 of the variables and the remaining factors only account for as much as a fraction 
of a variable which is why they are ignored. It can be said that together the three retained factors (1, 2 
and 3) represent as much of the variance as just over 8 of the 11 observed variables in our analysis.  
 
The last two columns in Table 4.2 indicate the amount of variance explained by each factor, and the 
cumulative value of underlying variance explained by the factors. Factor 1 represents 51.8% of the total 
variance in our variables, factor 2 accounts for 12.8% and so forth. Additively our three retained factors 
explain 74.3% of the variance in our data together, which is considered fairly strong. Importantly for our 
analysis, this means that retaining only factors 1, 2 and 3 and the variables that they ‘represent’ will not 
cause a substantial loss in explanatory power.  
 
In columns 2 to 4 of Table 4.3 below, the rotated factor loadings of the variables are presented i.e. a 
variable is said to load on a factor if it is highly correlated with that underlying factor or concept (Suhr, 
2005:1). Load values (which can also be referred to as coefficients) that are close to 1 or -1 indicate a 
close relation between the variable and that factor (Price-Smith et al, 2004:158). We have generated a 
‘rotated’ solution to obtain a clearer impression of which variables load uniquely onto the different 
factors and to eliminate the correlation between the different factors. This method involves taking a 
                                                          
34
 Figures rounded-off 
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linear transformation of each of the factors to obtain a clearer picture of the relevance of each variable 
in that factor.35In Stata 11.0 Econometric Software the default rotation using the ‘Varimax’ technique 
produces orthogonal factors which means that correlations between the factors are eliminated.  In this 
paper an orthogonal rotation is used to eliminate correlations between the three factors and isolate the 
contribution of each variable to each factor more accurately without changing the fundamental 
relationship between each observed variable and the respective factors. Rotated factor loadings can be 
interpreted as standardized regression coefficients that regress each factor on the observed variables. 
These coefficients are therefore the weights that we will assign to each observed variable in relation to 
the three factors as we will describe below.   
 
With reference to the Common Factor Model in Figure 4.1, uniqueness is related to the unique factors 
that underlie each of the observed variables, E1 to E5. The uniqueness of each variable presented in the 
last column of Table 4.3 is simply the variance within that variable that is unique to it and not shared 
with the other variables. So for example, the variable for military expenditure with a uniqueness of 
43.1% captures a different aspect of state capacity to the other variables, and is the most unique of our 
observed variables.  
 
Table 4.3. Rotated Factor Loadings 
 
A factor loading is generally considered ‘large’ if it exceeds 0.4.36 In the table of factor loadings it is 
evident that school enrolment, telephone lines, sustainable access to water, physicians per 1000, nurses 
per 1000, hospital beds per 1000, and the percentage of roads paved all load very well onto factor 1. We 
can therefore name this underlying factor the ‘State Infrastructure’ factor because we have defined 
each of these variables as a proxy for health care sector and overall state infrastructural capacity. 
Government effectiveness and GDP per capita are the most significant for factor 2, followed by school 
                                                          
35
 In Stata 11.0 Econometric Software the default rotation using the ‘Varimax’ technique produces orthogonal 
factors which means that correlations between the different factors are minimized 
36
 Available online: http://support.sas.com/publishing/pubcat/chaps/55129.pdf (p. 29) 
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enrolment, telephone lines, and sustainable access to water. These variables generally relate to overall 
economic development and the quality of public service (government effectiveness measures the 
quality of public service delivery overall; education, communication infrastructure and access to water 
are important public services closely related to economic development). We can therefore loosely name 
this factor the ‘Economic Development’ factor. Military expenditure and tax revenue collection load well 
onto factor 3. From earlier discussions in this Chapter we know that both of these aspects relate to how 
well a state is able to control societal behaviour – states with a strong ability to reach into society and 
extract resources and those with the military power to assert control in their territory have high levels of 
despotic power or state autonomy. We can therefore name this factor the ‘State Autonomy’ factor.  
 
These factor loadings or standardized coefficients represent the weights in our analysis. Instead of 
defining our own weighting system, we use Stata 11.0 to estimate the predicted values from the 
coefficients for each of the countries in our analysis on each factor (factor scores), using a simple 
regression. In this way each country will have its own predicted factor score for each of our three factors 
(state infrastructure, economic development, and state autonomy). To derive our final state capacity 
index from the component factors we simply add the scores that each country obtained for each of the 
three factors related to state capacity to get a single state capacity score for each country.    
 
To simplify the index for subsequent analysis, all of the values are rescaled to range between 0 and 1, 
with 1 being the country with the highest capacity in the sample. Due to data limitations the index is 
unfortunately only calculated for 82 of the 108 countries in our sample for which HAART coverage data 
is available – we only calculate the index for countries where data is available for each of our eleven 
observed variables. The mean value for the index in the sample of countries is 0.479 and the standard 
deviation is 0.278. Table 4.3 below presents the State Capacity Index scores and HAART coverage for the 
82 countries included. 
Table 4.3. State Capacity Index (SCI) scores and HAART coverage 2009 (%) 
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5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes our data and the empirical model that we will apply. Our dependent variable is 
the natural log transformation of UNAIDS HAART coverage estimates for 2006 and 2009.37UNAIDS 
HAART data for both these years is available for 108 countries. We will only test our main regression 
using the 2006 data to see whether there has been any significant change in the determinants of HAART 
coverage over time. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach with robust standard errors is used to 
adjust for heteroscedasticity in our cross-sectional, cross-country model. Building on work by Nattrass 
(2008) and Schwardmann (2008), only those AIDS affected countries with adult HIV prevalence rates of 
at least 0.1% are assessed. The model will take the following generalized functional form: 
 
ln (HAART Coverage) = 0 + 1*(Log of Adult Prevalence) + 2*(Urban Population) + 3*(Health/Govt. 
Expenditure) + 4*(Donor Disbursements) + 5*(Log of GDP per capita) + i*Xi + e 
 
5.1. Independent Variables 
 
5.1.1. Epidemiological 
The first important factors to control for are the varying characteristics of the epidemic in each country. 
Specifically, UNAIDS adult HIV prevalence (ages 15-49) for 2006 and 2009 is included as an indicator of 
the magnitude of the threat that HIV poses in a given country.38 Theoretically the levels of antiretroviral 
drug coverage should be substantially higher in countries where HIV prevalence is high. This is mainly 
because in the absence of a vaccine for HIV, HAART is considered an essential alternative for prolonging 
life and increasing the quality of life of people living with HIV/AIDS and it thus forms a crucial part of a 
country response strategy. As such, governments (and non-governmental entities) in severely affected 
countries are expected to respond more aggressively to the epidemic.39We note however, that in 
countries with high HIV prevalence it may be more difficult to respond to the epidemic as providing 
treatment to a larger number of people has resource implications. It is thus important to also control for 
the level of domestic and international funding available.  
 
 
                                                          
37
 The log transformation of this data is useful for suppressing the bias caused by outliers in the data, as well as 
allowing the coefficients of explanatory variables to be interpreted as elasticities which are particularly useful for 
analyzing changes in HAART coverage in response to small changes in the determinants 
38
 In the actual analysis the natural log of this variable is used to account for significant outliers 
39
 Schwardmann (2008:9) argues that this could also be in response to greater pressure from civil society in 
severely affected countries where HIV/AIDS is likely to be more in the ‘spotlight’ as a political issue 
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5.1.2. Financial and Economic 
We noted in Chapter 1 that domestic funding of AIDS programmes and international donor aids were 
the most important determinants of HAART coverage. To account for the significant impact that 
economic considerations have on HAART provision, we include three variables that address specific 
aspects of funding and economic development.  
 
The first of these is a measure of public health-specific expenditure as a share of total government 
expenditure. This variable is sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators dataset for 
2006 and 2007 (unfortunately this is the most recent data available to analyze HAART coverage for 
2009). This measure provides a good indication of the extent to which government prioritizes 
expenditure on health in general in relation to other demands on the budget. While this figure includes 
but is not specific to AIDS, it does reflect expenditure on improving the quality of clinics and the 
availability of skilled health personnel which are essential to the provision of HAART in general. This 
amount typically includes the expenditure on drug therapy by government which constitutes the most 
expensive portion of the cost of providing HAART across countries.40 We can expect that governments in 
countries significantly affected by HIV/AIDS would commit more funds to AIDS response strategies and 
improving health sector capacity in general. However in the presence of other competing health crises 
(e.g. malaria) or developmental objectives such as social welfare and education, there is an opportunity 
cost to prioritizing health care expenditure on treatment which may mean lower HAART coverage 
outcomes.  
 
A second economic variable included is the aid disbursements for HIV/AIDS control divided by the HIV 
positive population in a country. This data is sourced from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). It 
reflects the average aid disbursements by OECD countries, multilateral organisations such as the Global 
Fund and other international donor organisations over the period 2006-8 in US$ millions.41 HIV 
population data is sourced from UNAIDS for 2007. The data from the OECD has the advantage of 
reflecting the combined disbursements from a wide array of global sources. We include the 
commitments per HIV positive person in the population in order to account for the aid availed by the 
international community in relation to the need in AIDS-affected countries.  
 
Thirdly, we must account for the overall levels of economic development and income levels of 
individuals in the sample of countries. Populations and governments in poor countries tend to face a 
wide array of concomitant developmental problems and their ability as a society to respond to crises of 
                                                          
40
 See Nattrass (December, 2008) for a detailed perspective on the direct costs of ARV rollouts and the role that 
national government policy and leadership plays in extending coverage 
41
 Alongside OECD countries, donors captured in the data include the AfDF, Global Fund, EC, UNICEF, UNDP, and 
UNAIDS amongst others. Available online: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline  
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which AIDS is only one is severely constrained by their general resource limitations. Higher levels of 
income per capita theoretically affect HAART coverage positively as more people in need of treatment 
can afford it out-of-pocket. At the same time, as an indicator of the overall levels of economic 
development in a country, it can be expected that a wealthier country (individuals and government), 
other things being equal, can ‘afford’ a more extensive HAART rollout. To this end the log of GDP per 
capita in 2006 and 2009 at constant 2000 US$ valuation is included, as sourced from the World Bank 
WDI. In combination the variables for GDP per capita, government health expenditure and international 
aid provide a comprehensive picture of the financial context surrounding AIDS response policy in a given 
country. We expect that higher levels of funding and economic development result in higher HAART 
coverage. 
 
5.1.3. Political system factors 
Our discussion in Chapter 3 outlined the arguments pertaining to how political systems work to enable 
higher HAART coverage outcomes. We presented the view that an analysis of political factors as 
determinants of HAART coverage needs to focus on how decisions are made and how they are 
implemented to ensure an effective rollout. We therefore delineated a limited set of factors that we 
consider as relevant to the discussion of political systems, decision-making and implementation, namely: 
political regime, cultural fractionalization and government centralization.  
 
Our discussion on political regime-types looked at the potential strengths and shortfalls of democratic 
regimes in providing HAART. We also discussed why authoritarian governments which tend to place less 
emphasis on human rights are less likely than democracies to emphasize a non-discriminatory 
environment in which people are free to come forward for testing, treatment and care. This view 
suggested that the levels of HAART coverage are expectedly lower in authoritarian countries, although 
there are some examples of authoritarian states that have achieved a great deal in terms of combating 
HIV/AIDS. In our earlier discussion we also described the Polity IV indicator of regime-type which is a 21-
point scale ranging from ‘-10’ for autocracies to ‘+10’ for democracies. We apply this measure in our 
analysis because we find it is a more comprehensive rating of different political regimes than a simple 
dummy variable for whether a country is a democracy or not. We will use 2006 and 2008 as 2008 is the 
most recently available data for this variable. We expect to find that democracies on the whole, tend to 
produce higher levels of HAART coverage.  
 
By taking the square of the Polity IV indicator, we are also able to test whether there is a potential non-
linear relationship between HAART coverage and regime-type as discussed in Chapter 3. This 
relationship may exist on the basis that authoritarian governments typically have high levels of state 
autonomy and can act aggressively to combat HIV/AIDS if they view it as a threat to economic 
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development. We therefore create an additional variable which is the square of the Polity IV variable to 
test this hypothesis.   
 
The second political institution variable that we include is Fearon’s (2003) measure of cultural 
fractionalization/diversity taken from the Quality of Governance (QoG) Dataset for the year 2006. 
Unfortunately this measure reflects a constant figure for each country from 2006 to 2009 so we use the 
same values for our 2006 and 2009 HAART regressions. This measure reflects the probability that two 
randomly chosen people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group and also adjusts 
for cultural differences as delineated by the ‘structural distance’ between the languages of different 
groups (Teorell et al, 2010:91). A higher value indicates a more fractionalized society. Using an example, 
in countries that have many different ethnic groups, and where the languages used between each of 
these groups are fundamentally different from each other, the score for cultural diversity is higher. In his 
analysis of different measures of societal boundaries and their application to AIDS policy, Lieberman 
(2009:245) explains that “the greater the distance between the languages of people from two different 
groups, the greater the degree to which people might imagine the boundaries between them”. In this 
way the combination of ethnic and linguistic differences represents a significant part of the differences 
in culture.42He finds that Fearon’s measure of cultural fractionalization is more comprehensive than 
other similar measures because of its wide geographical coverage and the explicit emphasis on the 
social and political significance of cultural boundaries.43We can thus expect that in countries where 
there are strong ethnic and linguistic distinctions between groups, HIV/AIDS stigma and fear of 
association with the disease will most likely result in lower HAART coverage.  
 
Our last political institution variable is a dummy variable for government centralization for 2004 from 
the QOG dataset and originally extracted from Pippa Norris data (Teorell et al, 2010:138). This variable 
classifies each state as either 0 for non-unitary, or 1 for unitary. We use this variable to indicate whether 
a country has a unitary (or centralized) structure of government, or one with devolved powers and 
authority (decentralized). While this is not an ideal measure in that it gives no indication as to the extent 
to which political authority and accountability for revenue collection or decision-making are devolved to 
sub-national levels of government, it provides some guidance as to whether a country does have some 
form of decentralized political system. Our interpretation of the results using this indicator will also 
consider the fact that a country with a non-unitary government may not necessarily run their HAART 
programme in a decentralized structure owing to limited capacity in sub-national units or preference for 
a centralized rollout programme in which central government holds all decision-making authority. From 
                                                          
42
 Of course there are other factors that also influence ‘culture’, such as religion  
43
 Lieberman (2009) creates his own indicator called the Ethnic Boundary Index for 85 countries. He classifies 
countries on the number of boundaries as well as the institutionalization of those boundaries i.e. “the degree to 
which ethnic categories formally and informally structure social and political interactions in the polity” (Lieberman, 
2009:247). We do not include this indicator in the analysis as it significantly reduces the number of observations 
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our earlier discussions, we can expect to find that decentralized (non-unitary) governments do not 
achieve good outcomes in terms of HAART due to political, resource and capacity constraints.   
 
5.1.4. Indicators of state capacity 
Our research question asks whether countries with higher levels of state capacity as measured by tax 
revenue as a share of GDP or an index of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage. In 
Chapter 4 state capacity was defined as the endogenous ability of the state to formulate and implement 
public policy. We argued that it was important for a country to have adequate levels of capacity in terms 
of bureaucratic, infrastructure and human resources, but also in terms of despotic power to make 
decisions and extract resources from society to achieve policy objectives. A state with low levels of 
capacity will experience far greater difficulty in implementing an effective HAART programme than a 
state with greater endogenous capacity. We expect that HAART coverage will thus be higher in countries 
with high levels of capacity. We present two different measures that are used in the literature to 
measure state capacity: Tax Revenue as a share of GDP, and the State Capacity Index adapted from 
Price-Smith (2004). 
 
Tax revenue as a share of GDP is one of the simplest available indicators of state capacity. A state that is 
able to effectively extract tax revenue from society is considered to have a good state capacity and this 
serves as a good indicator of their ability to implement policy in general. A country with higher tax 
revenue to GDP should be better able to implement an effective HAART rollout and will thus 
demonstrate higher levels of HAART coverage. This is also because a higher level of tax revenue provides 
government with more funds to implement a rollout programme. While a more specific measure of 
taxation ability such as ‘income tax as a share of total taxes’ has been shown to be more reflective of the 
endogenous capabilities of the state, it is difficult to compile due to data availability constraints. A 
concern with using tax data is the comparability of data across countries due to different tax policies and 
structures. To account for this, data sources are limited to those that apply the same general definition 
for what counts as tax revenue. We use taxation data from the World Bank WDI and the International 
Monetary Fund Article IV Country Reports.44 The data is for the year 2008 and where data is missing, 
figures have been sourced from the most recent available WDI data covering the years 2005 to 2008. 
 
Our state capacity index is described in detail in the previous chapter. We have developed this index 
drawing from methodology applied in Price-Smith (et al, 2004), but adapting the index using our own set 
of observed variables and a completely different method for weighting different variables. With 
                                                          
44
 The World Bank and IMF definition used: Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government 
for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social security contributions 
are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue (WDI 
Online) 
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reference to our research question, we expect to find that a country with high levels of state capacity as 
measured by the index is likely to achieve higher levels of HAART coverage.  
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter we present the results from our regression analysis on the determinants of HAART 
coverage and discuss our findings. We first present the analysis for HAART coverage in 2009 and then 
run our main model including the state capacity index for the 2006 data to see whether the 
determinants of HAART coverage have changed significantly over this period. 
 
Regression 1 in Table 6.1 includes the core variables of the model, controlling for both the 
epidemiological and economic variables with the log of HAART coverage in 2009 as the outcome 
variable. Our independent variables here are adult HIV prevalence (log), public health expenditure as a 
share of total government expenditure, donor fund disbursements per HIV-positive person in the 
population, and GDP per capita (log). Together these variables explain 26.1% of the variance in cross-
country HAART coverage. Observations are limited to 81 mainly because of the incomplete data 
available on aid disbursements. As expected, the log of adult HIV prevalence is statistically significant 
with a positive coefficient. This confirms that in countries where HIV prevalence is relatively high, the 
level of HAART coverage will tend to be higher (than in less affected countries) in response to a larger 
threat posed by HIV to society. In Chapter 5 we suggested that it would be more difficult for countries 
with high HIV prevalence to achieve better levels of treatment coverage however the significance of the 
donor fund disbursement and GDP per capita variables suggest that with high levels of funding and 
economic development, this effect is less likely. The donor funding variable is statistically significant at 
the 5% level with a positive coefficient such that for every 10% increase in donor disbursements, HAART 
coverage increases by 1.3%. The GDP per capita variable is significant at the 1% level such that for a 10% 
increase in per capita income, HAART coverage increases by 2.3%. What is most interesting in regression 
1 is that the government health expenditure variable is not significant. This contradicts our earlier 
argument that funding from domestic governments was critical for providing access to HAART. This 
effect may be caused by the fact that we are only using 2007 health expenditure data which may be less 
relevant for 2009. It may also be that funding from external sources is specifically targeted for HIV/AIDS 
intervention whereas the health budget is shared with other critical health concerns such as malaria in 
some countries, thus limiting the funding available for treatment interventions. 
 
Regression 2 includes our three political institution variables – Polity IV regime-type, cultural 
fractionalization, and government centralization. Of these, only the centralization variable (where 1 = 
unitary government) is statistically significant at the 10% level with a positive coefficient. The positive 
coefficient tells us that as we expected, centralized or unitary governments are most likely to produce 
better HAART coverage policy outcomes. This is consistent with the UNAIDS ‘Three Ones’ principles 
where there is a single national framework and authority that oversees the national intervention 
programme. This finding also supports the argument we presented earlier that decentralization of 
treatment provision by government would depend on there being sufficient capacity in sub-national 
units to implement an effective rollout. Both the Polity IV regime-type variable and the measure of 
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cultural diversity are not significant, but have the expected directional effects – the Polity IV variable has 
a positive sign suggesting that countries with higher scores on the 21-point scale (democracies) tend to 
have higher levels of HAART coverage; and the negative sign on the cultural fractionalization variable is 
consistent with the view that high levels of politically salient fractionalization lead to lower HAART 
coverage outcomes. Including the three political institution variables improved the explanatory power of 
the model significantly with an R2 of 37%.  
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Table 6.1. The determinants of HAART coverage 2006 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
The Determinants of HAART Coverage (2006 & 2009)
ALL Countries
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Log of 
HAART 
2006
Independent Variables:
Adult HIV Prevalence 2009 (log) 0.182*** 0.192*** 0.165*** 0.187*** 0.165*** 0.102
0.045 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.047 0.067
Health to Govt Expend (%) 0.018 0.004 0.024 0.011 0.026 0.081***
0.016 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.023
Disbursement/HIV+ (log) 0.140** 0.103 0.154** 0.143* 0.089 0.132
0.057 0.063 0.069 0.072 0.086 0.097
GDP per capita 2009 (log) 0.235*** 0.241*** 0.206*** 0.230***
0.057 0.070 0.059 0.069
Polity IV Regime Type 0.008 0.009 0.004 -0.010
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.018
Cultural Fractionalization -0.419 -0.408 -0.363 -0.508
0.330 0.351 0.426 0.632
Centralization (1=unitary) 0.396* 0.490* 0.592** 0.546
0.225 0.251 0.293 0.356
Tax Revenue/GDP 0.010* 0.003
0.006 0.006
State Capacity Index (SCI) 0.698* 1.117**
0.360 0.473
Constant 1.224** 1.339* 1.093* 0.977 2.336*** 0.763
0.573 0.741 0.625 0.773 0.590 0.796
Observations 81 77 76 72 65 64
R^2 0.261 0.372 0.285 0.400 0.380 0.380
F-Statistic 6.51 5.91 5.31 5.11 5.17 7.71
Coefficients are marked *, **, *** for significance @ the 10%, 5%, & 1% level respectively
Robust Standard Errors in italics below coefficients
Dependent Variable: Log of HAART Coverage (2009)
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To test whether there may be a non-linear (quadratic) statistical relationship between HAART coverage 
and regime-type we include the square of the Polity IV variable in a separate regression. Table 6.2 below 
reflects this result. 
 
Table 6.2.  Regression of HAART Coverage (log), Polity IV Regime Score, and the Polity IV Score Squared 
Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value 
Polity IV Regime -0.006 0.012 0.619 
Polity IV Score Squared 0.005 0.002 0.041 
Constant 3.556 0.118 0.000 
Model R
2
 = 4.1%; Prob. > F = 0.085; No. of Observations = 104 
 
We see in the table that there is evidence to suggest a non-linear relationship between HAART coverage 
and regime-type. The coefficient for the squared term is positive and it finds significance at the 5% level. 
The original variable is not significant and has a weak negative coefficient. While we should not read too 
much into this finding because we do not control for other factors, it provides some evidence that 
authoritarian governments are also able to achieve high HAART coverage outcomes. Figure 6.1 below 
plots HAART coverage on the vertical axis and the Polity IV scale (not squared) on the horizontal axis. 
The figure shows that there are two groupings of countries with HAART coverage of above 40% - this 
occurs at Polity IV scores of below ‘-5’ (autocracies) and those above ‘+5’ (democracies). Indeed, average 
HAART coverage in countries that rate above ‘+5’ on the Polity IV scale is 52.6% while it is 48.3% for 
countries that rate below ‘-5’, which is a marginal difference. This relationship seems to be fairly weak 
from what we see on the scatter plot but it suggests that there is some merit in the argument that 
authoritarian governments are able to attain levels of HAART coverage that are similar to those in more 
democratc countries. This result does not hold when we include both the Polity IV variable and its 
square in the full model controlling for epidemiological and economic variables which suggests that this 
finding is not robust (we do not include this regression in Table 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1. Scatter plot of HAART coverage and Polity IV regime-type 
 
 
Regression 3 introduces our first measure of state capacity to the main model – tax revenue as a share 
of GDP for 2008. We find that this measure has a positive and significant coefficient in the regression 
specification excluding the political institution variables. There is therefore evidence that countries with 
high levels of state capacity, for which tax revenue as a share of GDP is a proxy, tend to achieve higher 
levels of HAART coverage. We mentioned in Chapter 4 that the tax revenue variable picks up two effects 
– as a proxy for state capacity it indicates the domestic government’s ability and autonomy to 
implement policy overall (despotic and infrastructural power), but also the actual revenue that the 
government is able to extract to finance government expenditure. The fact that the health expenditure 
variable is not significant in the model may thus mean that the variable is picking up more of the former 
effect and not the revenue aspect – however, we cannot confirm this directly from our model.  
 
When we include the political institution variables in regression 4 with the tax revenue variable, we find 
that the tax revenue variable is no longer statistically significant in the model. We believe that there may 
be two possible reasons for this. The first is that as we saw in Table 2.1, Nattrass (2006 & 2008a) and 
Schwardmann (2008) found that democracies were most likely to achieve better HAART policy outcomes 
partly because they were likely to have better functioning administrations. Hanson (2008) assesses the 
impact of state capacity and democracy on health and education policy outcomes. He measures state 
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capacity using data on the historical roots of states arguing that “state capacity should be strongly 
correlated with the depth of the state’s historical roots”; and the quality of state bureaucracies because 
an institutionally and administratively capable state should achieve better policy outcomes (Hanson, 
2008:5). With regard to health policy outcomes as measured by infant mortality, rates of immunization 
and life expectancy his results were interesting. He found that although democracy and state capacity 
had positive impacts on these public policy outcomes respectively, there was no evidence that 
democracy and state capacity measures acted in a complementary way to produce better outcomes 
(Hanson, 2008:13). He finds some evidence that the two effects may in fact be substituting for one 
another in his model. The relevance of this for our analysis is that introducing both the Polity IV regime 
variable and the tax revenue measure in the model actually introduces a substitution effect between the 
two variables as Hanson describes which dilutes the effect of the tax revenue variable. Nattrass 
(2008a:5) actually applies the logic that established democracies are likely to have better functioning 
governments, suggesting that a measure of democracy can actually also reflect the institutional state 
capacity of the country.  
 
The second reason to explain why the tax revenue variable is not statistically significant when we 
introduce political institution factors is the possibility of a negative relationship between democracy and 
tax revenue. We note that the majority of the countries in our sample (56 out of 108) are strong 
democracies with regime scores of above ‘+6’ based on the guidelines for using the Polity IV indicator 
(Marshall  & Jagger, 2005). Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) studies the cross-country determinants of tax revenue 
in 86 developing countries and finds that being a democracy consistently relates to lower levels of tax 
revenue. She finds empirical support for the idea that the electoral constraint in democracies limits the 
autonomy of government to implement its own preferences, whereas autocratic governments are able 
to act in a more predatory manner to extract resources from society (ibid, 1999:396). So controlling for 
political regime-type in regression 4 possibly introduces this interaction between democracy and tax 
revenue where there are two competing effects involved. The first is that there is evidence in Nattrass 
(2006 & 2008a) and Schwardmann (2008) that democracy relates to higher HAART coverage. Secondly, 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) presents evidence that levels of taxation could be higher in more autocratic 
countries. If higher levels of taxation are associated with authoritarian states, and higher HAART 
coverage is associated with democratic principles; then state capacity to extract resources will not lead 
to better levels of HAART coverage, other things equal. As we discussed in Chapter 3, authoritarian 
governments may have the necessary capacity, but potentially lack the political incentives, 
accountability and regard for some human rights to deliver this particular public good in most cases. The 
combination of these effects may explain the weak outcome for the tax revenue measure when we 
control for the type of regime in a country. 
 
Table 6.3 below presents the results of a regression of the log of HAART coverage on our state capacity 
index. The results here show that our index has a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
HAART coverage as expected. Without controlling for other variables, the measure explains 8.5% of the 
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variance in HAART coverage and is significant at the 10% level. This is encouraging evidence that a broad 
measure of a country’s infrastructural, institutional, and health sector capacity can be applied to the 
analysis of the determinants of HAART coverage with good results. The fact that the measure comprises 
a range of different aspects that are critical to implementing a government policy such as a HAART 
rollout is important as a principle. It acknowledges the fact that providing treatment effectively requires 
more than just health care professionals and medical facilities. It also requires a range of different but 
critical factors specific to each country such as the bureacratic capacity to ensure effective 
administration of the rollout programme as well as transport infrastructure to make it possible for 
people to travel to gain access to treatment facilities as we mentioned before. Indeed, if we look at the 
three factors that comprise our index which we derived from the PCFA analysis, providing access to 
treatment is enabled by a combination of state infrastructure, economic development, and state 
autonomy. 
 
Table 6.3. Regression of HAART Coverage (log) and the State Capacity Index 
Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value 
State Capacity Index 0.476 0.273 0.085 
Constant 3.554 0.169 0.000 
Model R
2
 = 8.51%; Prob. > F = 0.085; No. of Observations = 82 
 
Regression 5 incorporates the state capacity index in our model in which we include the political 
institution factors but exclude the GDP per capita variable. GDP per capita is omitted to avoid ‘double-
counting’ the effect of the variable which is also a significant component of the state capacity index. This 
also applies to the tax revenue variable. The regression results show that the state capacity index is 
significant at the 10% level. However, due to the fact that not all of the countries in our sample have full 
data available for the variables that comprise our index, we lose a significant number of observations in 
the regression and only account for 65 countries. Despite this, we can certainly gain some insight from 
the results.  
 
The model explains 38% of the variation in cross-country HAART coverage. The only variables that are 
statistically significant are the HIV prevalence and the centralization dummy variable, both with positive 
coefficients as we found before. This finding indicates that when we control for endogenous state 
capacity as measured by the index, countries with a high HIV prevalence are still able to achieve better 
HAART policy outcomes. The statistical significance of the centralization variable suggests that high 
HAART coverage outcomes are consistently more likely in countries with unitary governments even 
when we control for state capacity. This contradicts our argument in Chapter 3 that decentralization of 
treatment programmes could be effective if sub-national units have adequate levels of capacity with 
which to implement programmes. A possible explanation is that intervening factors such as ethnic 
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fractionalization, which we have argued can confound political decision-making processes, could result 
in unequal distribution of state resources to sub-national levels of government. For instance, in a 
country with high levels of ethnic fractionalization political leaders at the national government level may 
be biased towards their own ethnic group and support base in terms of building health care 
infrastructure and providing budgetary resources to increase access to treatment.  Alternatively, in a 
country where the epidemic is concentrated within a particular ethnic group, a political leader from 
another grouping may not see it as a priority to direct state resources towards providing treatment to 
people from that ethnic group. The fact that the donor funding variable loses its significance in this 
regression suggests that when a government has high levels of institutional and infrastructural capacity, 
donor funding contributions are perhaps less critical to ensure an effective rollout and domestic 
governments may rely more on domestic capacity.  
 
In regression 6 we compare our model for HAART coverage in 2009 to the determinants of coverage in 
2006. Regression 6 includes our political institution factors and the state capacity index. It is most 
appropriate to compare the results in regression 6 with regression 5, as they both control for the same 
set of variables. We note again that the cultural fractionalization and centralization data are unchanged 
as the fractionalization variable is a country constant, and the government centralization indicator was 
only available for 2004. The explanatory power of the model in regression 6 is the same as in regression 
5 with an R2 of 38%. Once again we lose a number of observations due to data limitations.  
 
In regression 6 the HIV prevalence variable is not statistically significant as a determinant of HAART 
coverage, whereas it was for 2009 data. However, the coefficient has a p-value of 0.136 which is only 
marginally outside of the 10% level of statistical significance which tells us that the scale of the epidemic 
in each country was an important determinant of HAART coverage for countries even in 2006. 
Government health expenditure is statistically significant in the 2006 model at the 1% level, whereas it 
was not significant in all of our regressions using 2009 data. There are two possible reasons for this. The 
first is that as we noted before only 2007 health expenditure data was available for inclusion in the 2009 
HAART data model, which may have created a mismatch in our analysis in terms of when those funds 
were spent (2007), and the outcome variable (2009 HAART coverage).45The second reason may be to do 
with the fact that while there was a significant increase in external funding for HIV/AIDS in the period 
during and just after the ‘3-by-5’ initiative, there is some evidence that domestic governments often 
matched external funding received with domestic expenditure on HIV/AIDS during this period as well 
(Lief & Izazola-Licea, 2006). In a review of HIV/AIDS financing in 13 developing countries, the authors 
found that “in all 13 countries, international HIV/AIDS assistance has increased, and all 13 have 
simultaneously increased their own domestic HIV/AIDS public spending” over the period 2001 to 2005 
                                                          
45
Even then, the variable coefficient has a p-value of 0.116 which is marginally beyond the 10% level of significance 
so domestic government health expenditure still has some ‘non-negligible’ effect on HAART coverage outcomes in 
our model, 
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(ibid, p. 1).46Indeed all 13 countries received increased international aid for HIV/AIDS over this period, 
but they did not reduce their own levels of public spending on HIV/AIDS or other government 
programmes (ibid, p. 4). This evidence suggests that domestic governments did not only rely on external 
funding assistance to increase treatment provision, but committed their own resources as well which 
explains why the health expenditure variable is significant in the 2006 model.  
 
Our three political institution measures are not statistically significant in the 2006 model, whereas the 
decentralization variable was significant in the 2009 model. Our state capacity index is statistically 
significant at the 5% level which affirms our finding that countries with high levels of state capacity are 
better enabled to achieve higher levels of HAART coverage. In regression 6, the regime-type variable has 
a small, negative coefficient. The ambiguity of the results we have found using this variable is possibly 
because of the evidence we presented in this Chapter that authoritarian regimes can perform well in 
terms of providing access to HAART even though coverage was slightly higher in democracies. Therefore, 
because the Polity IV indicator accounts explicitly for both authoritarian and democratic characteristics 
in a government, there is not a clear outcome as to which type of regime is most likely to result in better 
HAART coverage outcomes.  
 
The cultural diversity variable coefficient has shown a negative directional effect throughout our analysis 
which is consistent with the arguments presented in Chapter 2 and 3. A possible explanation for why the 
variable is not statistically significant is that our sample countries are those that have already made the 
decision to establish a programme for providing treatment – which we did not consider before. In this 
way, these countries have overcome the challenges associated with political fractionalization such as 
stigma and shame of association which typically result in political leaders not wanting to openly address 
HIV/AIDS or not openly acknowledging the risk that HIV/AIDS poses to society as a whole. We argued 
earlier that from a pragmatic point of view political commitment in terms of HAART can be 
demonstrated by governments simply making the decision to initiate a rollout and committing scarce 
state resources towards implementation. Therefore, for our sample the effect of fractionalization on 
decision-making and implementation for HAART programmes is not as significant an issue because these 
countries have essentially already demonstrated their political commitment. Over the course of the ‘3-
by-5’initiative many countries responded to the international consensus built up through such initiatives 
and the global impetus to provide universal access to treatment as a strategy to combat HIV/AIDS.47The 
availability of international funding and support would have certainly made it easier for domestic 
governments to initiate or expand HAART programmes. The countries in our sample are therefore 
countries that in 2006 were making decisions as to how to use increased international donor funding 
                                                          
46
 The 13 countries included are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chile, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Romania, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and Vietnam 
47
See Schwartländer (et al, 2006) for a brief review of how the consensus about providing universal access to 
treatment has developed through successive editions of the International AIDS Conference over the ten years from 
the 1996 Vancouver Conference 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
THANDO VILAKAZI – VLKTHA003 – MASTERS DISSERTATION 
64 
 
and domestic resources to expand access to treatment and not decisions about whether to issue a 
treatment rollout in the first place. Arguably, initiating a new large-scale rollout programme can be a 
more imposing task for governments than expanding on an existing programme where distribution 
systems, bureaucratic procedures and a national strategic framework have already been established. 
The fact that the government health expenditure variable is significant for the 2006 model supports this 
view.  
 
The government centralization indicator consistently shows that HAART coverage policy outcomes are 
better in countries with unitary or centralized governments where decision-making authority and 
strategic planning of a rollout programme are concentrated within central government. In regression 6, 
the coefficient of the centralization variable is positive and only just falls beyond the 10% level of 
significance (p-value of 0.131). The consistent effect that we see with this variable suggests that the 
‘Three Ones’ principles in which there is a central authority (most likely the ministry of health) that 
coordinates strategic planning and systems for monitoring and evaluation are most likely to result in 
higher HAART coverage outcomes. The fact that many decentralized governments at least in Africa are 
formed for political reasons (e.g. to resolve ethnic conflicts, the effects of civil war, or political 
instability) means that success in terms of coordinated and eff ctive service delivery is likely to be 
constrained in these countries. This effect may be even stronger in countries with high levels of 
politically salient ethnic and cultural fractionalization as politicians from different groupings find 
themselves fighting for power and control over resources – “highly fractionalized societies face higher 
levels of competitive rent-seeking among competing groups, resulting in higher transaction costs to 
reach agreement on public goods like health service, education, and infrastructure” (Cho, 2007:2). 
 
In all, the comparison of 2006 and 2009 data shows three effects: 
1. Domestic health funding and higher levels of state capacity were the most important factors in 
explaining the variations in 2006 HAART coverage  
2. In 2006 and 2009, regime-type and cultural fractionalization have less of an effect on HAART 
policy than we expected due to intervening factors such as the availability of international 
assistance and domestic health expenditure in 2006 
3. International donor funding is important but is not the most critical determinant of HAART 
coverage when we control for domestic state capacity for 2006 and 2009 data.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
We set out to answer two questions related to the determinants of cross-country HAART coverage. The 
first of these asks how political institutions function to enable better HAART coverage outcomes and the 
second asks whether countries with higher levels of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART 
coverage. Throughout the paper we argue that an analysis of the determinants of HAART coverage 
should focus on factors that have a strong influence on how domestic governments go about making 
critical decisions regarding HAART rollout programmes, and how they are able to implement those 
decisions. To frame our approach to these research questions we focused our analysis along two main 
dimensions, namely a political institution dimension and a state capacity dimension.  
 
On the first dimension we introduced three political institution variables that we believe impact on 
government decision-making and implementation, namely political regime, cultural fractionalization, 
and government centralization.  
 
In terms of political regime-type, we expected to find that while there are examples of authoritarian 
countries that have achieved high levels of HAART coverage, it was more likely that higher levels of 
coverage will be achieved in democracies. Our findings in this regard were ambiguous at best. The 
political regime variable did not have a significant impact on our model, both for 2006 and 2009 HAART 
coverage. On the other hand, we found weak evidence in our data that both democracies and 
authoritarian regimes are able to achieve high levels of HAART coverage, although average HAART 
coverage was marginally higher in democracies. Our discussions throughout the paper lead us to the 
conclusion that democratic governments are effective at providing treatment to those who need it and 
the potential shortfalls of democratic systems such as weak political opposition or drawn out 
bureaucratic processes are not as significant as we might have thought. We also think that the 
autonomy that authoritarian governments have to make policy decisions positively affects their ability 
to provide treatment such that HAART coverage levels in these countries are certainly comparable to 
those in democracies. Finally, we find that controlling for other factors, specifically the level of economic 
development and state capacity, particularly in countries with a high HIV prevalence, reduces the 
salience of political factors such as the type of regime as institutional determinants of HAART coverage.  
 
Regarding cultural fractionalization, we expected to find that the levels of HAART coverage would be 
lower in countries where ethnic and cultural differences were institutionalized or politically salient. 
Indeed, although our variable was not particularly strong in our model, there is an indication that high 
levels of fractionalization have a negative effect on the levels of HAART coverage in our sample of 
countries for 2006 and 2009. We therefore concur with the views in the literature that politically salient 
boundary institutions within a society affect the perceptions of the threat that HIV/AIDS poses; 
confound decision-making processes because of different groupings competing for power and scarce 
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state resources; and can lead to government inaction on providing treatment due to a combination of 
stigma and shame of (group) association with the disease. However, we note that the increasing number 
of governments that have followed the international consensus by committing state resources to 
facilitate rollout programmes suggests that political considerations such as cultural fractionalization 
have a lessened effect on the levels of HAART coverage than we might have expected. 
 
In relation to government centralization, we expected to find that the levels of HAART coverage are 
likely to be higher in countries with centralized governance institutions, particularly in resource-
constrained settings. We found convincing evidence that while decentralizing the decision-making and 
implementation of HAART programmes could have benefits in terms of flexible and localized strategies, 
unitary or centralized governments achieve higher levels of HAART coverage. From our discussions it 
seems that centralized governments are in a better position to exercise strategic oversight, coordinate 
decision-making and planning, and monitor progress over national rollout programmes than non-unitary 
governments.   
 
On the second dimension we introduced two measures of endogenous state capacity from the literature 
that we believe impact government decision-making and implementation in terms of providing 
treatment, namely tax revenue as a share of GDP, and our own state capacity index. State capacity is 
broadly defined as the ability of government to implement policy. On a pragmatic level, we argue that 
providing HAART is a highly resource-intensive process that encompasses not only funding, but also the 
infrastructural, institutional, and human resource capacity to ensure effectiveness in implementation. 
Therefore, in relation to both of our measures for state capacity we expected to find that countries with 
higher levels of state capacity generally achieve higher levels of HAART coverage. 
 
Regarding the tax revenue indicator, we found evidence that countries with higher levels of tax revenue 
collection as a proxy for state capacity, achieve higher levels of HAART coverage. This is a result of three 
effects: firstly, tax revenue provides a greater pool of budgetary resources to actually finance 
government expenditure on policy programmes including providing HAART; secondly, tax revenue is an 
indirect measure of state autonomy, and the despotic power of government to extract resources from 
society with which to achieve its objectives; and thirdly, as an outcome of an actual state policy, tax 
revenue collection is reflective of the institutional and infrastructural ability of government to 
implement policy in general. However, we note that the strength of the tax revenue variable as a 
determinant of HAART coverage in our model is potentially affected by an ambiguous relationship that 
exists between tax revenue collection and regime-type.  
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We developed our own index of state capacity using Principal Component Factor Analysis (PCFA). The 
index is a broad, composite measure incorporating measures of infrastructural, bureaucratic, and health 
care sector capacity to arrive at a single country score for state capacity. Applying this index to our 
analysis has yielded encouraging results in terms of our research question. The index is a significant 
determinant of HAART coverage for both 2006 and 2009. In this regard, countries with higher levels of 
state capacity as measured by the index are most likely to achieve higher levels of HAART coverage. We 
therefore confirm our view that domestic endogenous state capacity is a critical determinant of HAART 
policy outcomes, and is a broader concept than simple measures of health sector capacity.  
 
In general, our findings suggest a few areas for further research. A weakness in our study is that we do 
not pursue empirical evidence on the inter-relationships that exist between our political institution 
factors. For instance, it may be that the inclusive nature of democracy places democratic governments 
in a better position to limit the negative effect that ethnic and cultural fractionalization has on HAART 
outcomes. Another possibility is that centralizing decision-making authority, budgetary resources, and 
planning within central government has the effect of limiting the adverse effects of fractionalization by 
allowing a central authority to ensure that resources for providing treatment are equitably distributed 
regardless of social grouping. In our view, each of these is an important consideration and could serve as 
the basis for future analysis. Another avenue for further research is to apply the state capacity index to 
analyses of other AIDS policy outcomes related to prevention strategies, and to assess how the 
determinants of prevention strategy outcomes might be the same or different from those for treatment 
strategies across countries. 
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